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BEYOND THE LITTLE DUTCH BOY: AN ARGUMENT
FOR STRUCTURAL CHANGE IN TAX DEDUCTION
CLASSIFICATION
Jeffrey H. Kahn*
Abstract: One of the most active disputes in tax law today is the question of the proper
tax consequences for a successful plaintiff, a portion of whose taxable damage award is paid
to his or her attorney pursuant to a contingent fee arrangement. At issue is whether the
plaintiff is taxable on the portion of the award that is payable to the attorney. One aspect of
this problem was resolved prospectively by the adoption of the American Jobs Creation Act
of 2004, but the problem continues to exist in other areas. The United States Supreme Court
resolved a split in the United States Circuit Courts of Appeals with respect to the taxation of
contingent attorney's fees in Commissioner v. Banks, but that decision provides no comfort
for the plight of taxpayers because the government prevailed. Moreover, the attorney's fee
dispute is only one small example of a much larger problem. Instead of dealing with the root
cause of the problem, the focus (both in the courts and in Congress) has been on whether to
provide a "fix" for the specific plight of the taxpayers who have raised issues in court. The
courts and Congress, like the Little Dutch Boy, may be willing to plug one hole, but the
broader problem is a structural fault in the "dam" of the tax law system-namely, the
improper classification of a significant number of expenditures as itemized deductions. This
Article argues that the current list of nonitemized deductions wrongly excludes a number of
items, especially some that are directly connected to the production of income. This
erroneous exclusion imposes an unwarranted and severe tax burden in far more
circumstances than the attorney's fee problem on which Congress exclusively focused in the
American Job Creation Act of 2004. The harsh consequences resulting from the
misclassification of a number of items are exacerbated by the stringent limitations currently
imposed on many itemized deductions; but even a repeal of those limitations, which is
unlikely to occur, will not cure all of the harm that a wrongful classification causes. This
author hopes that highlighting several examples of misclassification will induce Congress to
implement a commission to study the entire classification system, rather than to rest on its
laurels for solving one small part of the problem in the American Job Creation Act of 2004.
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INTRODUCTION
One of the most active disputes in tax law today is the question of the
proper consequences for a plaintiff who recovers taxable damages and
pays a portion of the award to his or her attorney pursuant to a
contingent fee arrangement.' At issue is whether the plaintiff should be
taxed on the portion of the award that is payable to the attorney. The
dispute has attracted considerable attention, particularly because the
effect of taxing the plaintiff for the attorney's portion of the award has
been severe and patently inappropriate. Not only does the tax imposition
contravene tax policy,2 but in the case of discrimination suits, it also
frustrates a major purpose of the civil rights legislation that authorized
those causes of action.3 Congress resolved the civil rights aspect of this
problem on October 22, 2004, by adopting Section 703 (the Civil Rights
Tax Relief provision) of the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 (the
2004 Act).4 However, the problem continues to exist in other areas.
Prior to the enactment of the 2004 Act, the United States Supreme
Court agreed to resolve a split among the circuit courts of appeals with
respect to this tax issue;5 shortly before publication of this Article, the
Supreme Court decided those cases in favor of the Internal Revenue
Service (the Service) and held that the amount paid to an attorney under
a contingent fee arrangement is taxable to the plaintiff.6 The recent
1. See generally Deborah A. Geier, Some Meandering Thoughts on Plaintiffs and Their
Attorneys'Fees and Costs, 88 TAX NOTES 531 (2000); Gregg D. Polsky, The Contingent Attorney's
Fee Trap: Ethical, Fiduciary Duty and Malpractice Implications, 23 VA. TAX REv. 615 (2004)
[hereinafter Attorney's Fee Trap]; Gregg D. Polsky, A Correct Analysis of the Tax Treatment of
Contingent Attorney's Fee Arrangements: Enough with the Fruits and the Trees, 37 GA. L. REv. 57
(2002) [hereinafter Fruits and Trees]; Gregg. D. Polsky & Stephen F. Befort, Employment
Discrimination Remedies and Tax Gross Ups, 90 IOWA L. REV. 67 (2004).
2. See infra Part I.A.
3. See generally Laura Sager & Stephen Cohen, How the Income Tax Undermines Civil Rights
Law, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 1075 (2000).
4. American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 703, 118 Stat. 1418, 1546-48.
5. Banks v. Comm'r, 345 F.3d 373 (6th Cir. 2003), cert. granted, ... U.S. (Mar. 29, 2004), 124
S. Ct. 1712 (2004), rev'd, Nos. 03-892, 03-907, -U.S._, 2005 WL 123825 (Jan. 24, 2005);
Banaitis v. Comm'r, 340 F.3d 1074 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. granted, U.S- (Mar. 29, 2004), 124 S.
Ct. 1713 (2004), rev'd sub nom. Comm'r v. Banks, Nos. 03-892, 03-907, U.S. , 2005 WL
123825 (Jan. 24, 2005). Upon granting certiorari, the Court consolidated the cases.
6. Comm'r v. Banks, Nos. 03-892, 03-907, U.S. , 2005 WL 123825 (Jan. 24, 2005). The
Court held that the plaintiffs are taxable on the amount paid to the attorney. Id. The issue may not be
definitively resolved because the Court declined to pass upon an issue raised by the taxpayers
because it was raised for the first time in the Supreme Court. Id. In any event, the Court's resolution
of this issue does not affect the analysis and conclusions of this article.
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adoption of the 2004 Act's Civil Rights Tax Relief provision did not
render the case moot before the U.S. Supreme Court, however, for two
separate reasons. First, the relevant provision of the 2004 Act does not
apply to judgments and settlements made before the date on which the
2004 Act was enacted. Second, the relevant provision of the 2004 Act
does not apply to one of the two consolidated cases in the Supreme
Court, Banaitis v. Commissioner,7 because the taxpayer's claim for
damages, while arising in a wrongful discharge context, does not involve
discrimination or any of the other areas covered by the 2004 Act.8 This
lack of discrimination renders the 2004 Act inapplicable to Banaitis even
if that case were within the effective date of the Act.
The attorney's fee dispute is one small example of a much larger
problem in the classification of deductions. Rather than deal with the
problem's root cause, both courts and Congress have continued to focus
on whether to provide a "fix" for the specific plight of the taxpayers who
have raised issues in court. The courts and Congress, like the Little
Dutch Boy,9 may be willing to plug one hole, but the broader problem is
a structural fault in the "dam" of the tax law system-namely, the
improper classification as itemized deductions of a significant number of
expenditures directly related to the production of income. This Article
argues that, instead of plugging one hole at a time, it is time to replace
the dam.
Tax law divides deductions into two major categories: itemized and
nonitemized. 10 This Article addresses the avowed purpose, description,
and significance of that division. Put generally, the law treats itemized
deductions much less favorably than nonitemized deductions. For
example, the Internal Revenue Code (the Code) applies an overall
limitation to the amount of most itemized deductions yet does not apply
a similar limitation to nonitemized deductions." The Code places even
7. 340 F.3d 1074 (9th Cir. 2003), rev'd sub nom. Comm'r v. Banks, Nos. 03-892, 03-907,
U.S.-, 2005 WL 123825 (Jan. 24, 2005).
8. See American Jobs Creation Act § 703; Banaitis, 340 F.3d at 1076-77.
9. The tale of the Little Dutch Boy originates in Mary Mapes Dodge's 1865 book, "Hans Brinker
or The Silver Skates." MARY MAPES DODGE, HANS BRINKER OR THE SILVER SKATES 123-26
(1865). In the original, the Little Dutch Boy is a hero when he uses his finger to stop the flow of
water from a hole in a dam until help can arrive. Id. However, the reference has also come to
symbolize a situation where a person plugs leaking holes while ignoring the overall problem.
10. Nonitemized deductions are often referred to as "above-the-line" deductions because they are
deducted in determining adjusted gross income. J. MARTIN BURKE & MICHAEL K. FRIEL,
UNDERSTANDING FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 7 (2001).
11. I.R.C. § 68 (2000). Section 68 is scheduled to be phased out beginning in 2006, but it is
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greater restrictions on a subset of itemized deductions, classified as
"miscellaneous itemized deductions.''12 This Article asserts that the
current statutory limitations on certain itemized deductions (especially
miscellaneous itemized deductions) are unprincipled. Moreover, even if
the current treatment of itemized deductions were acceptable, the
inappropriate inclusion of certain deductions in the itemized category
causes harsh and unwarranted consequences.
Part I of this Article provides an overview of the federal income tax
system and describes nonitemized, itemized, and miscellaneous itemized
deductions and how the tax law treats these deductions differently. Part
II describes the "Little Dutch Boy" problem of attorney's fees and points
out several other areas where the limitations on itemized deductions
seriously distort taxable income and cause inequitable consequences.
Part III examines whether a principled justification exists for drawing
distinctions among the deduction categories and providing significantly
different treatment to each. Part IV examines whether the Code includes
expenditures that do not belong in the category of itemized deductions
and whose inclusion seriously distorts the measurement of taxable
income and violates the principle of horizontal equity.' 3 Part IV also
proposes legislative reform of the delineation and treatment of itemized
deductions and explains why only a legislative repeal or modification of
that concept will resolve both existing and future problems.
I. OVERVIEW OF TAXABLE INCOME-THE TAX
TREATMENT OF THE CATEGORIES OF DEDUCTIONS
This Part describes the role of deductions in the determination of
taxable income and the application of the alternative minimum tax. This
Part also describes the different categories of deductions and the
treatment of each category. Before the examination of deductions, there
is a brief discussion of the role that considerations of equity serve in the
tax system.
scheduled, phoenix-like, to be reborn in full force in 2011. Id. The operation of the overall
limitation is described infra Part I.D.
12. See I.R.C. § 67.
13. Horizontal equity requires that persons in like net income positions pay the same amount of
tax. Douglas Kahn, Accelerated Depreciation-Tax Expenditure or Proper Allowance for
Measuring Net Income?, 78 MiCH. L. REV. 1, 1 n.5 (1979).
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A. Equity as a Principle of Tax Policy
Equity is an important principle of tax policy. Essentially, equity
means treating taxpayers fairly so that people who have the same net
income will pay the same amount of income tax, and people who have
disparate amounts of net income will pay appropriately different
amounts of income tax. The goal of similarly taxing people with like net
income is referred to as "horizontal equity," and the goal of differently
taxing people with disparate net income is referred to as "vertical
equity."' 4 A tax law contravenes the principles of horizontal and vertical
equity when that law treats a type of expenditure as deductible in some
circumstances and as nondeductible in others, unless there is a principled
justification for that difference.
Tax rates should be applied to a taxpayer's net income-that is, the
taxpayer's gross income less the expenses incurred in producing and
collecting that income.' 5 To the extent that a taxpayer is taxed on an
amount greater than net income, the taxpayer will be taxed on gross
income. If a tax system were to tax gross rather than net income, it
would disfavor businesses with high costs. For example, if X expends
$400,000 to earn one million dollars of gross income, X has netted
$600,000 income from that business activity. If Y expends $100,000 to
earn $700,000, Y also nets $600,000 of business income. X and Y
should bear the same tax on their net income. If they were taxed on gross
income, however, X would pay a greater tax than Y. There is no valid
reason to favor Y's low-cost business over X's business by imposing a
lesser tax on Y.
Tax law provides deductions for some expenditures that are not
related to the production of income, such as charitable contributions,
medical expenses, and alimony.' 6 Whether or not those deductions are
appropriate, the taxpayer's net income is the maximum amount that
should be taxed. If some taxpayers are taxed on net income and others
are not, that violates the principle of equity.
While equity is an important principle of taxation, it can be sacrificed
if its application would conflict with another principle of greater
14. WILLIAM D. ANDREWS, BASIC FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 7-8 (5th ed. 1999).
15. In Commissioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687 (1966), the Court said, "[T]he federal income tax is
a tax on net income .... That principle has been firmly imbedded in the tax statute from the
beginning." Id. at 691. In Commissioner v. Sullivan, 356 U.S. 27 (1958), the Court expressly
disapproved of taxing more than net income. Id. at 29.
16. I.R.C. §§ 170, 213, 215 (2000).
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significance in the context in which the issues arise. For example, a fine
payable in a business context is not deductible1 7 because allowing a
deduction would diminish the deterrent impact of the fine. Similarly,
equity can be sacrificed to achieve a programmatic goal. However, in the
absence of a competing principle or goal of greater significance, the tax
law should not contravene equity principles.
B. Taxable Income
To facilitate understanding of why the current compartmentalization
of deductions is structurally unsound, it is useful to briefly outline how
individuals determine their tax liability under the current federal income
tax system. Tax rates are applied to an individual's "taxable income" to
determine tax liability.1 8 The taxpayer may then reduce his or her tax
liability by any credits to which he or she is entitled.19 Section 63 of the
Code defines taxable income as either (1) gross income minus the
deductions allowed (other than the standard deduction) 20 or (2) "adjusted
gross income" minus the standard deduction and the deduction for
personal and dependent exemptions, whichever the taxpayer chooses.21
C. Nonitemized Deductions
Code § 62 defines adjusted gross income (AGI) as gross income
minus the deductions listed in § 62(a). The deductions that are used to
determine AGI are referred to as "nonitemized deductions. 23 Examples
include trade and business deductions (other than the unreimbursed
business expenses of an employee),24 deductions attributable to property
17. Id. § 162(0.
18. Id. § 1.
19. DOUGLAS A. KAHN, FEDERAL INCOME TAx 20 (4th ed. 1999).
20. I.R.C. § 63(a). The standard deduction is a specified amount, depending on the taxpayer's
filing status, that may be deducted in lieu of utilizing the taxpayer's itemized deductions. Id.
§ 63(b), (c).
21. Id. § 63(b).
22. There are a few deductions not listed in I.R.C. § 62 that are allowed in determining adjusted
gross income. See, e.g., id. § 71(f)(1)(B) (excess alimony payments); id. § 164(f) (self-employment
taxes); id. § 165(h)(4)(A) (personal casualty losses).
23. See KAHN, supra note 19, at231.
24. I.R.C. § 62(a)(1). A few specified unreimbursed employee business expenses are allowed
nonitemized classification. For example, certain business expenses of performing artists and of state
govemment employees are nonitemized. Id. § 62(a)(2)(B)-(C).
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held for the production of rents or royalties,25 the alimony deduction,26
and moving expenses.27
D. Limitations on Itemized Deductions
All deductions that are not nonitemized, other than the deduction for
personal and dependent exemptions, are called "itemized deductions. 28
Examples include the interest deduction,29 charitable contribution
deduction,30 unreimbursed employee business expenses,3' gambling
losses,32 certain state and local taxes, 33 and the medical expense
deduction.34 Why is the distinction between itemized and nonitemized
deductions important? The Code subjects itemized deductions to more
limitations than nonitemized deductions. 35 For example, an overall
limitation currently applies to all but three of the itemized deductions.36
Itemized deductions are sometimes referred to as "below-the-line"
deductions because they are deducted after the taxpayer determines
25. Id. § 62(a)(4).
26. Id. § 62(a)(10).
27. Id. § 62(a)(15).
28. Id. § 63(d).
29. See id. § 67(b)(1). Note that since the adoption of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No.
99-514, sec. 511(b), § 163, 100 Stat. 2085, 2246-48, no deduction has been allowed to an individual
for "personal interest"-i.e., interest not connected with a business or income-producing activity
other than "qualified residence interest," interest on certain deferrals of estate tax payments, and
interest on "qualified educational loans." I.R.C. § 163(h). No deduction is allowed for interest
allocable to the trade or business of being an employee. Id. § 163(h)(2)(A).
30. See I.R.C. § 67(b)(4).
31. For a detailed discussion of the employee expense deduction, see infra Part lI.B.
32. Gambling or wagering losses are deductible only to the extent that the taxpayer has gambling
or wagering winnings in the same tax year. I.R.C. § 165(d). When a deduction is allowed, it is an
itemized deduction. See id. §§ 62, 63, 67(b)(3).
33. See id. § 67(b)(2).
34. See id. § 67(b)(5).
35. See, e.g., id. §§ 67, 68. In addition to the generic limitations, there are specific limitations on
many itemized deductions contained in the Code sections dealing with the deductions themselves.
For example, medical expenses cannot be deducted except to the extent that they exceed 7.5% of a
taxpayer's adjusted gross income. Id. § 213(a). Nonitemized deductions are generally not subject to
such floors (although one exception to this rule is I.R.C. § 274(n), where a fifty-percent limitation is
applied to business meals). These limitations are specific to the deduction in question and do not
relate to the problem of the detrimental treatment accorded to the class of itemized deductions.
Many income-connected deductions, whether nonitemized or not, are subject to the "at-risk"
limitation and the "passive activity loss" limitation. See id. §§ 465, 469.
36. Id. § 68.
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AGI.3
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1. Significance of Excluding Itemized Deductions from Adjusted
Gross Income
The exclusion of itemized deductions from AGI has adverse tax
consequences both on the use of the standard deduction and on the
amount that can be deducted for expenditures that are subject to a floor
based on a percentage of AGI. As discussed above, the definition of
taxable income is either gross income minus all deductions or AGI
minus the standard deduction (and personal and dependent exemption
deductions).3 8 Thus, a taxpayer can use either itemized deductions or the
standard deduction, but not both.39 As a result, itemized deductions are
useful only when and to the extent that they exceed the standard
deduction. There is no such limitation on nonitemized deductions, all of
which may be utilized by the taxpayer whether he or she itemizes or uses
the standard deduction.4 °
Moreover, by not allowing taxpayers to deduct their itemized
deductions from their AGI, the Code artificially inflates the taxpayer's
AGI. This inflated AGI causes some of the taxpayer's other itemized
deductions to be phased out because the Code subjects many of the
deductions to a floor that is based on a percentage of the taxpayer's AGI.
The higher the taxpayer's AGI, the higher the floor will be, causing
more of the taxpayer's deductions to be phased out. Also, an inflated
AGI may reduce tax credits. For example, a taxpayer's earned income
credit and child tax credit are phased out if the greater of the taxpayer's
AGI or earned income exceeds a threshold amount.4 1
2. Overall Limitation (Section 68)
A major limitation on the deduction of all but three of an individual's
itemized deductions is the so-called "overall limitation" imposed by
Code § 68.42 Section 68 reduces an individual's itemized deductions if
37. BuRKE & FRIEL, supra note 10, at 8.
38. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
39. See I.R.C. § 63(a).
40. For a discussion of possible justifications for the difference in treatment between the two
categories, see infra Part III.B.
41. I.R.C. § 24(b) (child tax credit); id. § 32(a)(2) (earned income credit).
42. This limitation does not apply to the deductions for medical expenses, investment interest,
and casualty and theft losses. Id. § 68(c).
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the individual's AGI for a taxable year exceeds a specific threshold.43
Currently, if a taxpayer's AGI exceeds a specific threshold, all but three
of the taxpayer's itemized deductions, otherwise allowable for the
taxable year, will be reduced by three percent of the excess of the
individual's AGI over the applicable threshold. 44 However, there is a
ceiling on the overall limitation; the amount of the reduction cannot
exceed eighty percent of the taxpayer's itemized deductions.45 This
phase-out of itemized deductions is itself being phased out beginning in
2006,46 but it will spring back to life in 2011.41
Because of this overall limitation on itemized deductions, a "double
whammy" may be imposed on a taxpayer if the Code improperly
classifies an expenditure as an itemized deduction subject to Code § 68.
Not only would Code § 68 improperly limit the deduction for the
expenditure, but it also would fail to reduce the taxpayer's AGI (as it
would if properly characterized as a nonitemized deduction), which can
increase the amount that Code § 68 renders nondeductible.48 One might
have thought that one improper treatment would be more than enough.
3. Miscellaneous Itemized Deductions
The overall limitation is not the only generic limitation on itemized
deductions. The Code includes a special subcategory of deductions
called "miscellaneous itemized deductions" within the category of
itemized deductions. 49 Examples include investment expenses, expenses
43. Id. § 68(a). Initially, the threshold amount was $100,000, but it is adjusted upward for
inflation each year. Id. § 68(b). For the year 2004, the threshold amount is $142,700. Rev. Proc.
2003-85, § 311, 2003-49 1.R.B. 1184, 1189.
44. I.R.C. § 68(a)(1), 68(c).
45. Id. § 68(a)(2).
46. Id. § 68(f), (g).
47. Id.; Economic Growth and Tax Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, § 901, 115
Stat. 38. The sunset provision states
In general.-All provisions of, and amendments made by, this Act shall not apply-
(1) to taxable, plan, or limitation years beginning after December 31, 2010; or
(2) in the case of title V, to estates of decedents dying, gifts made, or generation skipping
transfers, after December 31, 2010 ....
Id. The sunset provision was used as a means to avoid the "Byrd rule," a senate procedure that
requires sixty votes if the provisions affect revenue in years after the years covered in the bill. 2
U.S.C. § 644 (2000). Because the budget adopted by the Senate covered ten years, the sunset
provision allowed the Republicans to avoid application of the Byrd rule.
48. The same is true for any miscellaneous itemized deduction which should be classified as a
nonitemized deduction.
49. I.R.C. § 67.
Vol. 80:1, 2005
Tax Deduction Classification
incurred for the production of income or for the management,
conservation, or maintenance of income-producing property (but which
are unrelated to rents, royalties, or the conduct of a business), and most
unreimbursed employee business expenses.50 The Code limits these
deductions by both the overall limitation discussed above, and by
permitting the taxpayer to deduct the aggregate amount only to the
extent that it exceeds two percent of the taxpayer's AGI.51 Whether the
Code classifies an itemized deduction as a miscellaneous itemized
deduction depends upon an exclusionary rule: Code § 67(b) lists the
itemized deductions that are not miscellaneous itemized deductions.
Thus, if a deduction" is not listed in Code § 67(b) and is not a
nonitemized deduction, it is a miscellaneous itemized deduction subject
to the two-percent floor.
4. Nondeductibility in Determining Alternative Minimum Tax
The discussion above describes the "regular" federal income tax
system. However, in 1969, Congress added a computational wrinkle by
implementing a back-up system called the alternative minimum tax
(AMT).53 Congress originally designed the AMT to reach only a
relatively small number of taxpayers who, it thought, were utilizing too
many tax benefits that were granted for programmatic purposes.54
However, the scope of the AMT has been greatly expanded since its
original enactment. It has been predicted that, if no changes to the Code
50. The label "miscellaneous itemized deductions" is derived from the individual income tax
Form 1040. As the legislative history to the adoption of Code § 67 states,
The list of itemized deductions on Schedule A of Form 1040 includes a category labeled
miscellaneous deductions, following the listings for medical expenses, charitable expenses,
interest, taxes and casualty and theft losses. Under present law, this category generally includes
four types of deductions: (1) certain employee business expenses (sec. 162); (2) expenses of
producing income (sec. 212); (3) expenses related to filing tax returns (sec. 212); and (4)
expenses of adopting children with special needs (sec. 222).
H.R. REP. NO. 99-426, at 108 (1985). Prior to 1986, this characterization of certain itemized
deductions as "miscellaneous" did not have any significance as to how those items were treated for
tax purposes, but Form 1040 did separate them for purposes of listing them on the return. Id.
51. I.R.C. § 67.
52. This does not apply to a deduction for personal or dependent exemptions. Id. §§ 63(d), 67(b).
53. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 301(a), 83 Stat. 487, 580-85 (1969). The
alternative minimum tax system has been revised several times since 1969. See GREGG A.
ESENWEIN, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE REPORT FOR CONGRESS, THE ALTERNATIVE
MINIMUM TAX FOR INDIVIDUALS 2 (Jan. 30, 2003).
54. See S. REP. NO. 91-552, at 13 (1969), reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2027, 2040. Fora more
detailed discussion, see infra notes 173-78 and accompanying text. The overall limitation imposed
by I.R.C. § 68 does not apply to the AMT. I.R.C. § 56(b)(l)(F).
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are made, thirty-five million taxpayers (thirty-three percent of the total
number of taxpayers) will be subject to the AMT system by 2010.55
In effect, taxpayers are required to pay under whichever system
produces the greatest tax liability 56-the regular or the alternative
minimum. Although the marginal rates utilized by the AMT often are
lower than those of the regular tax, the amount of income subject to the
AMT usually will be greater than the amount that is subject to the
regular tax. The amount subject to the AMT is equal to the taxpayer's
taxable income altered by a number of modifications, including a denial
of certain deductions and credits.57 The Code refers to the modified
taxable income as the "alternative minimum taxable income', 58 A
taxpayer's alternative minimum taxable income is reduced by an
exemption amount that is phased out if the taxpayer's alternative
minimum taxable income exceeds a specified amount.5 9
More importantly, the AMT often exceeds the regular tax. A major
cause of having a higher AMT is that miscellaneous itemized deductions
(such as certain investment expenses, expenses of producing
nonbusiness income, and unreimbursed employee expenses) 60 cannot be
deducted in determining an individual's AMT. 61 Therefore, many
taxpayers will not be able to utilize any of their miscellaneous itemized
deductions.
II. EXAMPLES OF DISTORTIONS OF INCOME CAUSED BY
THE MISCLASSIFICATION OF DEDUCTIONS
This Part describes several circumstances in which the Code's
treatment of certain expenses as itemized deductions causes harsh and
55. ESENWEIN, supra note 53, at 6.
56. I.R.C. § 55(q). If the taxpayer's AMT is greater than the regular tax, Code § 55(a) requires the
taxpayer to pay the regular tax plus an additional amount equal to the difference between the AMT
and the regular tax. Id. § 55(a). In effect then, the taxpayer pays a total tax equal to the greater of the
AMT or the regular tax.
57. Id. § 56.
58. Id. § 55(b)(2).
59. Id. § 55(b)(l)(A)(ii), (d)(3).
60. These are itemized deductions that are not listed in I.R.C. § 67(b).
61. I.R.C. § 56(b)(1)(A)(i). Another important disallowance under the alternative minimum tax
system is the complete denial of the state and local tax deduction under Code § 164(a). Id.
§ 56(b)(l)(A)(ii); see Daniel Shaviro, Tax Simplification and the Alternative Minimum Tax, 91 TAX
NOTES 1455, 1464 (2001) ("For individuals earning $100,000 or more, the AMT's disallowance of
itemized deductions for state and local taxes is by far the largest single preference item.").
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inequitable consequences. The circumstances mentioned in this Part are
merely illustrations of flaws in the current tax law and do not constitute
an exhaustive list of the inequities engendered by the current tax law.
Each of these flaws is a hole in the dam and illustrates why Congress
should replace the dam.
A. Attorney's Fee Where an Award Is Taxable
The Code's treatment of the attorney's fee payable by a successful
plaintiff in a proceeding in which the award obtained by the plaintiff
constitutes taxable income 62 provides a glaring example of the improper
characterization of certain expenses as miscellaneous itemized
deductions, and indeed of their mischaracterization as itemized
deductions at all. In such cases, the Service has treated the entire amount
of the award as income to the plaintiff and has treated the attorney's fees
either as a deduction under Code § 212(1) (an expense for the production
or collection of income) or as a deduction under Code § 162 (an
unreimbursed employee expense).63 Under either section, the deduction
will be itemized and therefore usually will be either severely limited in
amount or entirely disallowed.
This problem has recently generated a significant amount of
commentary6 and litigation, including a U.S. Supreme Court decision.65
The court decisions and commentary have focused on whether the
portion of an award that is paid to the plaintiffs attorney as a contingent
fee should be excluded from the plaintiffs gross income.66 While lower
62. This issue does not arise in cases where the plaintiff receives only compensatory damages on
account of a physical injury because the recovery in that case would be nontaxable to the plaintiff.
See I.R.C. § 104(a)(2). In that case, the plaintiff would not be allowed to deduct the attorney's fee
expense. See id. § 265(a)(1).
63. See, e.g., Banks v. Comm'r, 345 F.3d 373 (6th Cir. 2003), rev'd, Comm'r v. Banks, Nos.
03-892, 03-907, __U.S., 2005 WL 123825 (Jan. 24, 2005); Banaitis v. Comm'r, 340 F.3d 1074
(9th Cir. 2003), rev'd sub nom. Comm'r v. Banks, Nos. 03-892, 03-907, __U.S. , 2005 WL
123825 (Jan. 24, 2005).
64. See generally Geier, supra note 1; Polsky, Attorney's Fee Trap, supra note 1; Polsky, Fruits
and Trees, supra note 1, Polsky & Befort, supra note 1.
65. See generally Comm'r v. Banks, Nos. 03-892, 03-907, _U.S._, 2005 WL 123825 (Jan. 24,
2005).
66. One commentator has proposed that an attorney's fee should be treated as an expense of
liquidating a claim, offsetting the income recognized on the receipt of damages. See generally
Charles Davenport, Why Tort Legal Fees Are Not Deductible, 97 TAX NOTES 703 (2002).
Essentially, Davenport contends that the expenses should be capitalized. See id. at 705. This is
contrary to the normal treatment of expenses incurred in collecting income or in liquidating an asset.
In this author's view, Treasury Regulation § 1.212-1(k) is dispositive and indicates that the expense
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courts have divided on this issue, a majority have held that the plaintiff
must include the entire amount of the award in income. The United
States Courts of Appeals for the Second, Third, Fourth, Seventh, Tenth,
and Federal Circuits have held that the attorney's fee is included in the
plaintiffs gross income,67 while the Fifth, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits
excluded the fee from the plaintiffs income.68 The Ninth Circuit is
divided within itself on the question, with the answer depending upon
the applicable state lien law.69 The U.S. Supreme Court resolved this
issue for the Service in Commissioner v. Banks,70 and Congress, in the
2004 Act, remedied this issue with regard to discrimination and certain
is currently deductible and not capitalized. Treas. Reg. § 1.212-1(k) (as amended in 1975). Professor
Davenport filed an amicus brief for Commissioner v. Banks. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Professor
Charles Davenport in support of respondents, Comm'r v. Banks, U.S. (Jan. 24, 2005) (Nos. 03-
892, 03-907).
67. See Raymond v. United States, 355 F.3d 107 (2d Cir. 2004), petition for cert. filed, 72
U.S.L.W. 1437 (U.S. Apr. 9, 2004) (No. 03-6037); Campbell v. Comm'r, 274 F.3d 1312 (10th Cir.
2001); Kenseth v. Comm'r, 259 F.3d 881, 883 (7th Cir. 2001); Young v. Comm'r, 240 F.3d 369,
379 (4th Cir. 2001); Baylin v. United States, 43 F.3d 1451 (Fed. Cir. 1995); O'Brien v. Comm'r,
319 F.2d 532 (3d Cir. 1963).
68. See Banks, 345 F.3d at 386; Davis v. Comm'r, 210 F.3d 1346 (11th Cir. 2000); Cotnam v.
Comm'r, 263 F.2d 119 (5th Cir. 1959).
69. See Banaitis, 340 F.3d 1074, (9th Cir. 2003) (ruling that, under Oregon law, taxpayer does not
include attorney's fees in income), rev'd sub nom. Comrn'r v. Banks, Nos. 03-892, 03-907,
.. U.S.-, 2005 WL 123825 (Jan. 24, 2005); Sinyard v. Comm'r, 268 F.3d 756 (9th Cir. 2001)
(suggesting state law does not matter, and holding attorney's fee must be included in taxpayer's
income), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 904 (2002); Benci-Woodward v. Comm'r, 219 F.3d 941 (9th Cir.
2000) (holding California law does not confer ownership interest to attorney, taxpayer must include
fee income); Coady v. Comm'r, 213 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that, based on Alaska law,
taxpayer must include amount paid to attorneys in income). For a discussion of the bizarre split
within the Ninth Circuit, see generally Noah M. Burton, The Taxation of Contingent Attorneys'
Fees: How the Ninth Circuit Got Lost in the Forest, 36 RUTGERS L.J. (forthcoming 2005); Polsky &
Befort, supra note 1.
70. Nos. 03-892, 03-907, .. U.S., 2005 WL 123825 (Jan. 24, 2005). Both Banaitis and Banks
were victories for the taxpayers in the courts of appeals (i.e., the attorneys' fees were excluded from
the taxpayers' incomes) and were reversed by the Supreme Court under the consolidated case
Commissioner v. Banks. Id. Several law professors filed amicus briefs. The taxpayers in those two
cases also argued that the contingent fee arrangement between a plaintiff and his attorney
constitutes a partnership, and they contended that the partnership income that is allocated to the
attorney is not taxable to the plaintiff. Brief for the Respondent at 15-1 6, Banks, -U.S._ (Jan. 24,
2005) (Nos. 03-892, 03-907); Brief for the Respondent at 5-21, Banaitis, sub nom. Comm'r v.
Banks, U.S.- (Jan. 24, 2005) (Nos. 03-892, 03-907). For one commentator's conclusion that the
partnership theory does not prevent taxation of the plaintiff, see generally Gregg D. Polsky,
Contingent Fees: Why the Partnership Theory Doesn't Work, 104 TAX NOTES 1089 (2004). The
Supreme Court rejected the taxpayers' partnership contention and held that no partnership was
formed. Banks, Nos. 03-892, 03-907, U.S.-, 2005 WL 123825 (Jan. 24, 2005).
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other employment cases.71
This author agrees that the U.S. Supreme Court is correct in holding
that all of the plaintiffs award, including the amount used to pay the
attorney, should be included in the plaintiffs gross income under the
current Code, regardless of the terms of the applicable state lien law.72
Notwithstanding, as a matter of good tax policy, the plaintiff should not
pay tax on that portion of the award used to pay the attorney's fee,
regardless of whether the fee is a fixed amount or a contingent
arrangement, because the taxpayer should be taxed only on the net
amount obtained from the taxpayer's claims after taking into account the
expenses of securing and collecting that claim.73 The reason that a
problem exists is that the attorney's fee should be (but is not) fully
deductible by the plaintiff. The fee would be fully deductible if it were
not for the restrictions placed on itemized deductions. An example will
bring the issue into focus.
Suppose Daniel Defendant makes a false and defamatory statement
about Peter Plaintiff. Peter would like to sue Daniel for damages. Peter
hires Larry Lawyer to represent him in his lawsuit against Daniel. Larry
agrees to represent Peter in the case, and they sign a contract. The
contract states that Larry is entitled to forty percent of whatever
compensation Peter receives from Daniel Defendant on account of the
lawsuit.
Larry successfully represents Peter, and the jury awards Peter
$2,000,000 in damages.74 Pursuant to the representation agreement,
Larry is entitled to $800,000 for his services. This leaves Peter with net
income of $1,200,000 from the lawsuit. Assume Peter won his suit in
2002, is single, and has no other income or deductions.75
What is the correct tax treatment of these events? The theoretical
answer reflecting horizontal and vertical equity is obvious. Peter should
71. See American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 703, 118 Stat. 1418, 1546-
48.
72. Banks, Nos. 03-892, 03-907, __U.S. , 2005 WL 123825 (Jan. 24, 2005).
73. See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
74. Note that it makes no difference whether the damages are compensatory or punitive: both are
taxable income to Peter. See KAHN, supra note 19, at 93-96. It also makes no difference whether the
amount is obtained from an award by a judge, jury, or through a settlement agreement with Daniel
Defendant. I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (2000). However, if the damages were compensatory for a physical
injury, there would be no tax issue as their receipt would be nontaxable to Peter. See id. As a result,
there would be no deduction for the attorney's fee. See id. § 265(a)(1).
75. Obviously, this is an unrealistic assumption, but it simplifies the calculations and has no
effect on the analysis of the issue central to this article.
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be taxed only on the net income that he received.7 6 That is, he should
pay federal taxes only on his net income of $1,200,000. 77 The correct
treatment would require Peter to include the full $2,000,000 in gross
income, but it also would allow Peter to deduct the $800,000 for the
attorney's fee expense as a nonitemized deduction. This amount
represents the cost of producing income, which should be deducted from
gross income to reach net income. Failing to allow a deduction, while
including the entire award in income, amounts to taxing the taxpayer on
the cost of producing income-the amount paid to the attorney. Taxing
such amounts violates the basic principle of income taxation that only
net income should be taxed.78
It might seem that the current federal income tax system achieves that
result, but it does not. Peter should include the full $2,000,000 in
income, and the current tax system allows Peter to deduct $800,000 for
the payment to the attorney. However, because the attorney's fee
expense is classified as a miscellaneous itemized deduction and is
subject to the limitations accorded to that classification, the current
treatment falls short of the optimum. 79 Instead, the current tax system
imposes taxes on an amount greater than the taxpayer's actual net
income.
The first limitation that could apply to this payment is the two-percent
floor for miscellaneous itemized deductions provided by Code § 67. The
tax law further penalizes Peter by increasing the limitation that Code
§ 67 imposes on the deduction of that fee (i.e., the two percent of AGI
floor is higher than it should be).8° If no other limitation applied, Code
§ 67 would disallow $40,000 of Peter's deduction for the attorney's fee
expense. Based on the highest marginal tax rate for individuals in 2002,
Peter would be required to pay an additional $15,440 in federal income
76. See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
77. See Polsky, supra note 1, at 68-70; Sager & Cohen, supra note 3, at 1103-04.
78. See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
79. Professor Davenport contends that the attorney's fee should offset the amount realized on the
claim. See supra note 66. If adopted, this would be a departure from the established treatment of
expenses incurred to collect income. While the adoption of an offset approach would cure Peter's
problem, it would not reach a vast number of other circumstances, such as the problem that an
athlete incurs when he pays an agent to negotiate an employment contract. See infra note 135 and
accompanying text.
80. Peter's payment to his attorney is a miscelianeous itemized deduction; therefore, it is not
included in determining his adjusted gross income. See I.R.C. § 62(a) (2000). As discussed
previously, the two-percent floor for miscellaneous itemized deductions is based on adjusted gross
income. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
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tax.
81
Sadly, there is more bad news waiting for Peter in Code § 68.
Allowable miscellaneous itemized deductions (that is, the amount in
excess of the two-percent floor) are'still subject to the overall limitation
in Code § 68.82 In 2002, the Code § 68 threshold amount was
$137,300.83 Because the threshold is compared to the taxpayer's AGI,
which does not reflect itemized deductions, Peter's payment to the
attorney will not decrease his AGI-causing him to exceed the threshold
by a greater amount.
Peter exceeds the threshold amount by $1,862,700. Code § 68
provides that the amount of otherwise allowable itemized deductions
shall be reduced by "3 percent of the excess of adjusted gross income
over the applicable amount., 84 Thus, Code § 68 would disallow $55,881
of Peter's attorney's fee expense, subjecting Peter to approximately
$21,570 in additional federal taxes. All in all, the operation of Code § 67
and § 68 would disallow $95,881 (approximately twelve percent) of
Peter's $800,000 "deductible" expense, thereby raising his federal
income tax liability by approximately $37,010.
As if the tax consequences from the limitations were not bad enough,
the federal tax system exacerbates Peter's problem through the use of the
AMT. As noted above, a taxpayer must also determine his tax liability
under the AMT system and pay under that system if it produces a greater
tax liability than does the "regular" system.85 Under the AMT system,
the Code disallows all miscellaneous itemized deductions.8 6 Therefore,
while the applicable itemized deduction limitations disallow
approximately twelve percent of Peter's attorney's fee deduction under
the regular tax system, the AMT system will disallow the deduction
entirely. This disallowance of itemized deductions basically ensures that
Peter will be subject to the AMT system because the decrease in
deductions will increase his tax liability under the AMT, making it
81. The highest individual marginal tax rate in 2002 was 38.6%. I.R.C. § 1.
82. The two-percent floor Code § 67 limitation applies before determining the amount subject to
the overall limitation in Code § 68. See id. § 68(d).
83. Rev. Proc. 2001-59, 2001-2 C.B. 623.
84. I.R.C. § 68(a)(1). The disallowed amount is subject to an overall limitation of eighty percent
of the itemized deductions. Id. § 68(a)(2). That is, no more than eighty percent of the taxpayer's
itemized deductions can be disallowed under Code § 68. See id.
85. See supra note 56.
86. See I.R.C. § 55(b)(1). The overall limitation on itemized deductions of § 68 does not apply to
the alternative minimum tax system. Id. § 56(b)(l)(F).
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greater than Peter's tax liability under the regular system.
To determine Peter's tax liability under the regular system, he would
begin with his gross income, $2,000,000, which is also his AGI.87 From
his AGI, he would deduct his itemized deduction: the attorney's fee
expense,88 reduced by the limitations in Code § 67 and § 68.89 While
taxpayers would normally also reduce their AGI by personal
exemptions, 90 Peter's AGI is high enough to phase out the entire amount
of Peter's exemption.91 Therefore, Peter's taxable income is $1,295,881
and his federal income tax liability is approximately $476,408.92 Under
the regular tax system, Peter's liability amounts to approximately forty
percent of his actual net income of $1,200,000.
To determine his tax liability under the AMT system, Peter must first
calculate his alternative minimum taxable income. The AMT system
views all miscellaneous itemized deductions as preference items and
disallows 100 percent of such expenses.93 Therefore, Peter's alternative
minimum taxable income is the full $2,000,000. Normally, taxpayers
reduce their alternative minimum taxable income by an exemption
amount.94 However, similar to the personal exemption under the regular
tax system, Peter's alternative minimum taxable income is high enough
to phase out the entire exemption. 95
Therefore, the full $2,000,000 is Peter's alternative minimum taxable
income. Under the AMT system, the first $175,000 is subject to a
twenty-six percent tax rate, and everything in excess of that is subject to
a twenty-eight percent tax rate.96 Peter's AMT liability would be
$556,500. Because this amount is greater than his tax liability under the
regular system, this is Peter's final federal tax liability. The AMT system
raises Peter's taxes by $80,092. Based on his "true" net income of
87. Peter's gross income and adjusted gross income are identical because he has no nonitemized
deductions.
88. The attorney's fee is deductible under either § 212 or, in some cases, § 162. See supra note 63
and accompanying text.
89. Note that despite the disallowance of a significant portion of his $800,000 "deduction," the
allowable portion of that expense would still be greater than the miniscule 2002 standard deduction
amount of $4,700. See I.R.C. § 63(c).
90. See id. § 151.
91. See id. § 151(d)(3).
92. For the tax rate tables for 2002, see Rev. Proc. 2001-59, 200 1-1 C.B. 623.
93. I.R.C. § 56(b)(1)(A)(i).
94. See id. § 55(d).
95. Id. § 55(d)(3).
96. Id. § 55(b)(l)(A)(i).
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$1,200,000, Peter would pay approximately forty-six percent in federal
income taxes, which is substantially greater than the highest nominal tax
rate.
97
Peter's tax liability under the current tax system appears even more
egregious when compared to the tax Peter would have owed if the
attorney's fee had been fully deductible (as it should be). If that were the
case, Peter would have paid $117,102 less in federal income tax.98
Using dubious legal reasoning based on the assignment of the
plaintiffs interest prior to the case being settled, several courts have
concluded that plaintiffs should not include in income an amount paid to
an attorney pursuant to a contingent fee arrangement (thereby avoiding
the deduction classification issue).99 While this result conforms to the tax
policy that a taxpayer is taxed only on net income, it departs from the
correct application of the law on income recognition. 100 In any event,
even if Peter's problem were cured by excluding the attorney's fee from
Peter's income because of the pre-trial assignment of a percentage
interest in the award, the ruling would be of no aid to a litigant who pays
his attorney an hourly fee.' 0 ' Unless a full deduction is allowed that
plaintiff, he will be overtaxed. Relief given only to litigants who have a
contingent fee arrangement exacerbates the inequity of failing to tax
other litigants correctly.'
0 2
The denial of a full deduction for attorney's fees is inappropriate
because they are a cost of producing or collecting income. The current
97. In 2002, the highest marginal rate for individuals was 38.6%. Id. § 1.
98. As shown above, if the $800,000 attorney's fee was fully deductible, Peter's regular tax
liability would have been $37,010 less. Because the alternative minimum tax is $80,092 greater than
his current regular tax, the alternative minimum tax is $117,102 ($80,092 + $37,010) greater than
the tax liability Peter would have had if there were neither a deduction limitation nor an alternative
minimum tax.
99. See, e.g., Banks v. Comm'r, 345 F.3d 373, 386 (6th Cir. 2003), rev'd, Comm'r v. Banks, Nos.
03-892, 03-907, -U.S. , 2005 WL 123825 (Jan. 24, 2005); Banaitis v. Comm'r, 340 F.3d 1074,
1083 (9th Cir. 2003), revd sub nom. Comm'r v. Banks, Nos. 03-892, 03-907, _.U.S. , 2005 WL
123825 (Jan. 24, 2005); see also Polsky, Fruits and Trees, supra note 1, at 74-76.
100. For a contrary view, see generally Davenport, supra note 66; Robert W. Wood, Settlements
and Judgments: Att'y Fees and Section 104 Cases, 104 TAX NOTES 733 (2004).
101. If Davenport's proposal for capitalizing attorney's fees, see supra note 66, were adopted, it
is unclear whether that categorization would be extended to hourly attorney's fees. There are
similarities but there also are differences.
102. Admittedly, hourly fee arrangements are rare in these suits. However, there are other
nonbusiness suits where hourly fees would be the norm (for example, lawsuits involving investment
disputes where the award would be taxable). There is no valid reason to treat the two fee
arrangements differently.
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system's treatment of attorney's fees is another hole in the dam and
further evidence that the dam needs to be replaced. Congress
prospectively addressed the treatment of attorney's fees in certain
-circumstances in the 2004 Act, but that provision leaves the attorney's
fee problem unresolved in cases not covered by the 2004 Act. By ruling
in favor of the Service on this issue in Commissioner v. Banks, the U.S.
Supreme Court left to Congress the task of dealing with the contingent
fee and other similar problems. 0
3
B. Employees and Independent Contractors-Different Tax Results
for the Same Expense
Another example of inequitable treatment caused by the itemized
deduction classification and its limitations relates to unreimbursed trade
or business expenses of employees, as compared to the treatment of self-
employed independent contractors. 10 4 Unreimbursed employee trade or
business expenses are specifically excluded from the list of nonitemized
deductions in Code § 62.105 By contrast, any valid trade or business
expenses of an independent contractor will qualify as a nonitemized
deduction, not subject to the limitations imposed on itemized deductions
(under either the "regular" or the AMT system). 1 06
Subject to a few narrow exceptions, 1 7 any trade or business expense
of an employee that is not reimbursed by the employer is specifically
excluded from the list of nonitemized deductions.10 8 Not only does such
an expense lose nonitemized deduction status, but because it is not listed
103. See Comm'r v. Banks, Nos. 03-892, 03-907, -__U.S._, 2005 WL 123825 (Jan. 24, 2005).
104. Of course, independent contractors are self-employed individuals for purposes of both the
income tax and the social security tax. Ware v. United States, 67 F.3d 574 (6th Cir. 1995); Treas.
Reg. § 31.3401(c)-1(b) (as amended in 1970). Although not all self-employed persons are also
independent contractors, this author will often refer only to independent contractors in this Article
because their activities more closely resemble those of employees.
105. I.R.C. § 62(a)(1) (2000). Employees can qualify for nonitemized treatment for their business
expenses, but only if their employer reimburses them. Id. § 62(a)(2)(A). By granting employees a
nonitemized deduction for reimbursed expenses, Congress has basically created a wash. That is, the
employee has income in the amount of the reimbursement, but also gets a full nonitemized
deduction for the business expense. Rather than forcing taxpayers to put both the income and the
expense on their return, the Internal Revenue Service allows taxpayers simply to exclude the
reimbursement from income. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 77-351, 1977-2 C.B. 23; Rev. Rul. 76-71, 1976-1
C.B. 308; Rev. Rul. 76-65, 1976-1 C.B. 46; Rev. Rul. 76-62, 1976-1 C.B. 12.
106. See supra Part I.D (describing limitations).
107. See I.R.C. § 62(a)(2)(B)-(E), (a)(15). These exceptions are discussed infra Part Iv.B.
108. I.R.C. § 62(a)(1), (2)(A).
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in Code § 67(b), it drops all the way down the deduction chain and is
classified as a miscellaneous itemized deduction. An employee can take
a miscellaneous itemized deduction only to the extent that the aggregate
amount of miscellaneous itemized deductions exceeds two percent of his
or her AGI. 109 After applying the two-percent floor to the aggregate
amount of miscellaneous itemized deductions, any remaining
unreimbursed expense will then be subjected to the overall limitation of
Code § 68. As a final blow, the miscellaneous itemized deduction will be
completely disallowed under the AMT system.110
The result of this treatment is that two taxpayers with identical
incomes and identical legitimate unreimbursed business expenses will
have vastly different tax consequences if one is an employee and one is
an independent contractor. This violates the basic principle of horizontal
equity. Moreover, this system has become a trap for the unwary.
Consider the following illustration.
Assume Paula and Peter are unrelated law professors at Duke
University. Both accept offers to teach for one academic year as visiting
professors at Stanford Law School, and both rent homes in Palo Alto,
each of which has a total rental cost of $40,000 for the period of their
visits at Stanford.
Suppose Stanford agrees to pay Paula $200,000 in salary. Paula uses
part of that salary to pay the rent for her home, her meals, and her
California income taxes. The rental and one-half of her food expenses
are deductible business expenses because Paula is temporarily away
from her regular place of business (Duke University).'11 However,
because Paula is an employee of Stanford, her expenses are
miscellaneous itemized deductions.'1 2 Not only are they subject to the
limitations set out in Code § 67 and § 68, they are completely disallowed
for purposes of the AMT. Most likely, this will require Paula to
determine her federal income tax liability under the AMT system. The
AMT is detrimental to Paula not only because it disallows all
miscellaneous itemized deductions, but also because it disallows any
deduction for the amounts Paula paid to California and North Carolina
for state income taxes.
113
109. Id. § 67(a).
110. Id. § 56(b)(l)(A)(i).
111. Id. §§ 162(a)(2), 274(n).
112. For many years, an employee's unreimbursed travel expenses were nonitemized deductions,
but they were deleted from the nonitemized list in 1986. See infra note 155.
113. See I.R.C. § 56(b)(l)(A)(ii).
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Suppose Stanford also offers Peter a salary of $200,000. However,
Peter, a tax professor, negotiates with Stanford to receive a reduced
salary if Stanford will pay for his housing. Stanford agrees to pay Peter
$160,000 in salary and to pay for the $40,000 rental of a home. Because
Peter is reimbursed for the business expense (the rental home away from
Peter's regular place of business), the deduction for that expense
qualifies for the nonitemized category. 14 Therefore, Peter may deduct
the full amount of the rental expense; it is not subject to the Code § 67
and § 68 limitations, and it is fully allowable for purposes of the AMT
system. In addition to reducing Peter's tax liability by avoiding
limitations on his deduction for the rental expenses, the nonitemized
characterization likely will allow Peter to avoid application of the AMT,
thereby allowing him to deduct the state income taxes that he pays. 15
Although Peter and Paula are in identical economic positions (i.e.,
they both receive $200,000 as payment for services from Stanford Law
School, and both incur the same amount of expense), they will incur
drastically different federal income tax liabilities. For example, assume
that this scenario occurred in 2002, Paula and Peter are both single, both
pay $18,000 in California state income tax, and neither has any other
income or any deductions other than those described above.116 Paula has
$200,000 in gross income, which is also her AGI because she has no
nonitemized deductions. Her itemized deductions are the $40,000 Palo
Alto housing expense and the $18,000 California state income tax
payment. 117 However, because Paula is an employee, the $40,000 rental
deduction is a miscellaneous itemized deduction; therefore, it is subject
to the two percent of AGI limitation in Code § 67.18 The amount of the
rental deduction in excess of the Code § 67 floor and the California state
income tax payment will be subject to the overall limitation on itemized
deductions. 119 Paula's allowable itemized deductions, after applying the
114. See id. § 62(a)(2)(A). Although there are obvious personal elements to these expenses, they
are deductible under Code § 162(a)(2) because they are travel expenses incurred away from home
that are required by the exigencies of the taxpayer's business.
115. See id. § 164(a).
116. For ease of calculation, this author will treat Paula's and Peter's salary from Stanford as
having been received in 2002 and they received no salary from Duke that year. These assumptions
have no effect on the analysis of the issues.
117. For ease of calculation, this author will ignore all other "away from home" business
expenses, such as meals, and will ignore any income taxes that Paula might be required to pay to the
State of North Carolina.
118. That limitation will disallow $4,000 ($200,000 x .02) of the rental expense.
119. Under Code § 68, Paula's otherwise allowable itemized deductions are reduced by three
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Code § 67 and § 68 limitations, total $52,119. Paula may also reduce her
income by her personal exemption of $1,440.120 Therefore, under the
regular federal tax system, Paula's federal taxable income is $146,441
and her federal income tax liability is approximately $38,507.121
Paula must also determine her tax liability under the AMT system to
see if that amount is greater. The AMT system disallows all deductions
for miscellaneous itemized deductions and for state income taxes.
122
Paula's alternative minimum taxable income is $200,000. Paula has an
AMT exemption amount of $11,875,123 leaving her with $188,125 in
income subject to the AMT rates. Paula's tax liability under the AMT
system is $49,175.124 This is more than $10,000 greater than her regular
federal income tax liability; therefore, she must pay this amount.
On the other hand, Peter will fare much better. Peter also has gross
income of $200,000 ($160,000 plus the $40,000 reimbursement for the
rental house). Because Stanford reimbursed Peter for the expense, the
rental housing expense is classified as a nonitemized deduction. 125 Thus,
it is taken into account for purposes of determining AGI, and Peter may
deduct the full $40,000 from his gross income. This leaves Peter with
AGI of $160,000.126 Peter may then deduct his itemized deduction (the
percent of the excess of her adjusted gross income over a threshold amount. In 2002, the threshold
amount was $137,300. See Rev. Proc. 2001-59, 2001-2 C.B. 623. Paula's adjusted gross income
exceeds the threshold by $62,700. Therefore, Paula must reduce her itemized deductions by $1,881
($62,700 x .03).
120. In 2002, the personal exemption amount was $3,000, but a high-income phase-out can
disallow a portion of that amount. Although the phase-out limitation applies to Paula, it will not
disallow the entire exemption amount. In order to determine the amount of the exemption that will
be phased-out, Paula must compare her adjusted gross income ($200,000) to the threshold amount
($137,300). Paula exceeds the threshold by $62,700. She must reduce her exemption by two percent
for every $2,500 or fraction thereof that she exceeds the threshold amount. Paula will reduce her
exemption by fifty-two percent, leaving her a personal exemption of $1,440. See I.R.C. § 151.
121. For the tax rate tables for 2002, see Rev. Proc. 2001-59, 2001-2 C.B. 623.
122. I.R.C. § 56(b)(l)(A)(i), (ii).
123. Normally, taxpayers may use an alternative minimum tax exemption of $33,750. This
amount, however, is subject to be phased-out for high income taxpayers. The exemption is reduced
by twenty-five percent of the excess of Paula's alternative minimum taxable income ($200,000)
over the threshold amount ($112,500). Paula's excess is $87,500, so her exemption is reduced by
$21,875, leaving her with an exemption of$11,875. See id. § 55(d).
124. See id. § 55(b)(1)(A).
125. Note that it makes no difference for federal tax purposes whether Stanford pays the rental
expense directly or reimburses Peter for the expense. Cf Old Colony Trust Co. v. Comm'r, 279 U.S.
716, 729 (1929) (holding employer's payment of federal income taxes on behalf of employee
constituted income to employee).
126. For convenience, the Service permits Peter to exclude the $40,000 reimbursement from
income and report gross income of only $160,000. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 77-351, 1977-2 C.B. 23
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California income tax) 127 and his personal exemption. 128 Peter's taxable
income is $140,281 and his federal income tax liability under the regular
system is approximately $36,399.129
Peter must also determine his tax liability under the AMT system.
Because the housing expense is a nonitemized deduction, Peter is still
allowed to deduct it for purposes of the AMT system. 130  Peter's
alternative minimum taxable income is $160,000.131 Peter's exemption
amount under the AMT is $21,875.132 Peter has $138,125 subject to the
AMT rates, which produces a tax liability under that system of
approximately $35,913.33 Therefore, Peter's tax liability is greater under
the regular system and his final tax liability will be approximately
$36,399.
The contrast between these two taxpayers could not be more striking.
Although she is in exactly the same economic position as Peter, Paula
will pay over $12,000134 more in federal income taxes-again, a clear
violation of the principle of horizontal equity. The classification of the
rental expense as a miscellaneous itemized deduction harms Paula
because it reduces her allowable deductions (both directly and by
(reimbursements to military attaches need not be reported as income to extent such expenses are
deductible); Rev. Rul. 76-71, 1976-1 C.B. 308 (employees need not report reimbursed educational
expenses to extent such expenses are deductible). The tax consequences to Peter are identical
regardless of whether he excludes the $40,000 reimbursement or includes it in income and takes a
$40,000 nonitemized deduction.
127. For ease of calculation, the author ignores any income taxes that Peter might be required to
pay to the State of North Carolina.
128. Note that although the high income limitations also apply to Peter (because his adjusted
gross income exceeds the threshold amount in both cases), his disallowances will not be as great as
Paula's because his adjusted gross income is much lower. Peter's adjusted gross income exceeds the
threshold amount by $22,700 (the threshold happens to be the same both for purposes of the overall
limitation and the exemption phase-out). Thus, Peter's overall limitation reduces his itemized
deduction by $681 (three percent of $22,700). His personal exemption is reduced by only $600
($22,700 divided by $2,500, or 9.08, resulting in a loss of twenty percent of his $3,000 exemption
amount).
129. For the tax rate tables for 2002, see Rev. Proc. 2001-59, 2001-2 C.B. 623.
130. The expense is not one of the listed modifications of taxable income required by Code § 56.
131. The California income tax payment is disallowed. I.R.C. § 56(b)(l)(A)(ii) (2000).
132. Peter is also subject to the alternative minimum exemption phase-out, but again the
reduction will be smaller than Paula's because his comparison benchmark is smaller. Peter exceeds
the threshold by $47,500 ($160,000 minus $112,500). Therefore, Peter reduces the exemption by
$11,875, leaving him with an exemption of $21,875. Id. § 55(d).
133. See id. § 55(b)(1)(A).
134. As calculated above, Paula's final income tax liability is $49,175 (calculated under the
Alternative Minimum Tax), while Peter's final tax liability is $36,399 (calculated under the regular
tax system).
Tax Deduction Classification
increasing her phase-outs) and pushes her into the AMT system, where
other deductions are also restricted.
Another example of egregious overtaxation caused by the wrongful
classification of unreimbursed employee expenses is found in the
treatment of professional athletes who employ an agent to negotiate their
contracts with their team. 35 Note that the nature of the tax injustice in
such cases strongly resembles the attorney's fee issue discussed in Part
II.A. As compensation, the athlete's agent typically will receive a
percentage of the amount that the team agrees to pay the athlete. When
an athlete signs a contract for a substantial salary and bonus, the amount
of the agent's fee will be very large. The agent's fee is a cost of
producing income and should be fully deductible. However, because
athletes are employees, an agent's fee will be classified as a
miscellaneous itemized deduction, which will cause it to be completely
disallowed for purposes of the AMT (to which the athlete is likely to be
subject because the agent's fee will be very large). Therefore, under the
AMT system, the agent's fee will not be deductible from gross income,
which will cause the athlete to be taxed on gross, rather than net,
income.
While this treatment of highly paid athletes, or even moderately
well-paid academics, may not arouse sympathy because of the size of
their incomes, they are not being taxed fairly. The goal of a fair and
equitable tax system does not rest on feelings of sympathy. The
mistreatment of the athlete who pays a large fee to an agent and the
academic who has sizable business travel expenses are merely
illustrative of the impropriety of limiting or denying a deduction for
employee business expenses. They represent two of the many holes in
the dam.
C. Income in Respect of a Decedent (IRD)-Defeating the Principal
Purpose
If an individual who earned the right to income dies before it becomes
taxable, it will be included in the gross income of the person (or the
individual's estate) who receives it after the individual's death.136 The
Code refers to such income as "income in respect of a decedent"
(IRD).137 In addition, the value of the right to the IRD will be treated as
135. This hypothetical was suggested to this author by Professor Gregg Polsky.
136. I.R.C. § 691(a)(1).
137. Id.
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an asset of the decedent's gross estate and subjected to federal estate
taxation if the estate is large enough. 38 However, the amount of the IRD
for federal estate tax purposes is not reduced by the potential income tax
liability to which the recipient of the IRD will be subjected. 139 If no
relief were provided, the imposition of both an estate tax and an income
tax on the same amount would improperly result in a higher overall tax
liability than would have been incurred if the IRD had been included in
decedent's income before he died.
The following illustration shows the nature of this problem. 140 Prior to
his death, George, who utilized the cash method of accounting, earned
the right to receive a bonus of $5,000,000 payable on January 15, 2005.
George died on December 14, 2004. The right to the $5,000,000 bonus
constitutes IRD, and it is included in George's gross estate, taxable at a
marginal estate tax rate of forty percent. George's estate paid an estate
tax of $2,000,000 on the IRD. Pursuant to George's agreement with his
employer, the employer paid the $5,000,000 bonus to George's son,
Sam, on January 15, 2005. George's will exonerates Sam from any of
George's estate tax liability.' 4 ' The IRD of $5,000,000 is included in
Sam's gross income, and it is taxable at a marginal rate of forty percent,
or $2,000,000. The total taxes paid on the IRD would then be
$4,000,000-i.e., an estate tax of $2,000,000 and an income tax of
$2,000,000.
The tax consequences are dramatically different if the order of
George's death and the payment of the bonus are reversed. If the
$5,000,000 bonus had been paid to George on December 1, 2004, and if
the marginal income tax rate on that income had been forty percent (the
same as Sam's rate), George would have incurred an income tax liability
of $2,000,000, reducing his taxable estate by that amount. Even though
George's will might still have left $5,000,000 to Sam, only $3,000,000
of the $5,000,000 bonus would have been included in George's gross
estate because the other $2,000,000 would have paid George's income
taxes. Assuming a marginal estate tax rate of forty percent on that
$3,000,000 amount, the estate tax payable thereon is $1,200,000. The
total income and estate tax liability arising from the bonus would then
138. Id. § 2033.
139. See id. § 2053(c)(1)(B).
140. In the illustration, arbitrarily chosen rates are used in order to simplify computations.
141. Because Sam will receive the full $5,000,000 without any reduction for estate tax liability,
Sam will have to include the entire $5,000,000 in his gross income.
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have been $3,200,000142_$800,000 less than the total tax payable if the
bonus was paid after George's death.
Congress has attempted to provide relief from the double tax burden
described above. A person who incurs income tax on IRD is allowed an
income tax deduction for the portion of the decedent's estate tax that is
attributable to the IRD. 14 3 That income tax deduction is referred to as a
"deduction for estate tax"144 because the amount of the deduction is
equal to a part of the decedent's estate tax. The estate tax deduction is
designed to make the total estate and income tax payable for IRD equal
to what the total tax would have been if the IRD had been included in
the decedent's gross income before he died. 145
While the estate tax deduction is an itemized deduction, it is not a
miscellaneous itemized deduction; 46 thus it is not subject to the two
percent of AGI floor. However, unless the taxpayer is subject to the
AMT, the overall limitation of Code § 68 will apply to the estate tax
deduction, which may cause a reduction of the amount deductible. If so,
the estate tax deduction will fail to accomplish the congressional purpose
of equalizing the tax consequences regardless of the order of the
payment and the taxpayer's death.
Consider the following illustration of the hardship that the imposition
of this limitation can cause. 147 In this illustration, the marginal estate tax
rate on the decedent's estate is forty percent, and all the taxpayers are in
the forty percent marginal income tax bracket. Professor Roger died
possessing a TIAA-CREF account of $5,000,000 of deferred
compensation. None of that amount had been taxed during Roger's life
because of a favorable deferred compensation provision in the Code. 148
Under Roger's agreement with TIAA-CREF, the $5,000,000 account is
payable to Roger's daughter, Della. All of the $5,000,000 will be IRD
and will be included in Della's gross income. The $5,000,000 of IRD
also is included in Roger's gross estate, which will create a $2,000,000
estate tax liability. Roger's will exonerates Della from incurring any of
142. Because it is no longer classified as IRD, there is no income tax consequence to Sam. An
inheritance of property is not income to the recipient. I.R.C. § 102.
143. Id. § 691 (c).
144. Id.
145. BORIS I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND
GIFTS 83.1.4 (2d ed. 1991).
146. I.R.C. § 67(b)(7).
147. For ease of calculation, arbitrary figures are used in the illustration.
148. Treas. Reg. § 1.402-1(a)(1)(i) (as amended in 2004).
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Roger's estate tax liability, and so other beneficiaries of the estate will
bear the tax.
Della must include the $5,000,000 of IRD in her gross income, but
she is entitled to an itemized deduction of $2,000,000 for the estate tax
paid on the IRD. 14 9 Della has no other income and has no nonitemized
deductions. Her itemized deduction of $2,000,000 is reduced by three
percent of the excess of her AGI of $5,000,000 over the threshold
amount (which we will assume is $130,000), or $146,100.150 Thus, the
Code § 68 limitation disallows $146,100 of Della's estate tax deduction.
Assuming that Della is in a forty percent marginal income tax bracket,
the loss of that deduction will increase her income tax liability by
$58,440.
In Roger and Della's illustration, the estate tax deduction fell
woefully short of carrying out the purpose for which it was adopted. The
overall estate and income tax on the $5,000,000 of IRD will be more
than $58,000 greater than it would have been if the $5,000,000 had been
included in Roger's gross income just before he died. This result
conflicts with the legislative purpose for creating the estate tax
deduction, which was to equalize the tax consequences incurred when
IRD is recognized after the decedent's death with the tax consequences
that would have been incurred if the decedent had recognized the income
before he died.
151
In this case, the operation of the limitation on deductions does not
treat a taxpayer unfairly so much as it frustrates a legislative purpose of
providing a deduction. Congress authorized the estate tax deduction in
order to eliminate the double taxation of certain income of an individual
who dies before receiving it when it would be taxed only once if the
individual received the income before his or her death. Any limitation on
that deduction contravenes the express purpose of the provision and
evinces yet another hole in the dam.
149. Because the purpose of allowing an estate tax deduction is to equalize the overall tax
consequences, regardless of the order of decedent's death and the receipt of income, the deduction is
allowed to the person who includes the item in gross income regardless of whether that person bore
any portion of the estate tax. I.R.C. § 691(c)(1)(A), (c)(2).
150. Under Code § 68, Delia's otherwise allowable itemized deductions are reduced by three
percent of the excess of her adjusted gross income over the threshold amount. Della exceeds the
threshold by $4,870,000. Therefore, she must reduce her itemized deductions by $146,100
($4,870,000 x .03).
151. See supra notes 143-45 and accompanying text.
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III. IS THERE A PRINCIPLED JUSTIFICATION FOR THE THREE
CATEGORIES?
The examples discussed in Part II illustrate the seemingly harsh and
unwarranted tax consequences imposed on some itemized deductions.
These consequences occur principally because the Code imposes
limitations on the amount that can be deducted. This Part examines
whether a principled justification exists for the classification and
limitation of itemized deductions. If a principled justification exists, we
should either accept it or modify the system by reclassifying some
deductions. The Part begins with a review of the history of itemized
deductions and the limitations imposed on them. It then analyzes the
possible justifications for the current system.
A. History of Nonitemized, Itemized, and Miscellaneous Itemized
Deductions, and the Alternative Minimum Tax
In 1944, Congress divided deductions into nonitemized and itemized
categories. 152  An individual taxpayer could use the nonitemized
deductions, listed in § 22(n) of the Code at that time, no matter how
small their total amount. 53 However, itemized deductions would be
useful only if the total amount exceeded the optional standard deduction.
At the time of its enactment, § 22(n) included the following deductions:
(1) trade and business deductions (other than employee expenses); 154 (2)
employee travel and lodging expenses; 155 (3) reimbursed employee
152. Congress introduced the concept of "adjusted gross income" in 1944 when Code § 22(n) was
added to the 1939 Code. See 1 J.S. SEIDMAN, SEIDMAN'S LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF FEDERAL
INCOME AND EXCESS PROFITS TAX LAWS: 1953-1939, at 1400 (1954). Section 22(n) was added by
§ 8(a) of the Individual Income Tax Act of 1944. Id. That same Act added § 23(aa), which created
the optional standard deduction for individuals. Id. Section 23(aa) allowed an individual taxpayer to
take the "standard deduction ... in lieu of... all deductions other than those which under § 22(n)
are to be subtracted from gross income in computing adjusted gross income." Id.
153. Because nonitemized deductions are taken into account in determining adjusted gross
income, they are deductible regardless of whether the taxpayer utilizes the standard deduction.
I.R.C. § 63(a), (b).
154. Section 22(n)(1) stated, "[t]he deductions allowed by section 23 which are attributable to a
trade or business carned on by the taxpayer, if such trade or business does not consist of the
performance of services by the taxpayer as an employee." See SEIDMAN, supra note 152, at 1290.
155. Section 22(n)(2) stated, "[tihe deductions allowed by section 23 which consist of expenses
of travel, meals, and lodging while away from home, paid or incurred by the taxpayer in connection
with the performance by him of services as an employee." See SEIDMAN, supra note 152, at 1291.
Note that Congress subsequently deleted this item from the nonitemized list in 1986 when it
introduced the two-percent floor for miscellaneous itemized deductions in Code § 67. See Tax
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expenses; 156 (4) deductions attributable to rents and royalties; 157 (5)
depreciation and depletion deductions of life tenants and income
beneficiaries of trusts; 158 and (6) losses from sales or exchanges of
property.1
59
In its report, the House Ways and Means Committee described
adjusted gross income as the difference between gross income and
"business deductions":
[T]he bill introduces a new concept, adjusted gross income. It is
defined to mean gross income less business deductions,
deductions attributable to rents and royalties, and losses treated
as losses from the sale or exchange of property .... It will be
seen, therefore, that in general adjusted gross income means
gross income less business deductions.'
60
In its report, the Senate Finance Committee provided a broader
definition of the type of deductions allowed in determining AGI:
Fundamentally, the deductions thus permitted to be made from
gross income in arriving at adjusted gross income are those
which are necessary to make as nearly equivalent as practicable
the concept of adjusted gross income, when that concept is
applied to different types of taxpayers deriving their income
from varying sources. Such equivalence is necessary for
equitable application of a mechanical tax table or a standard
deduction which does not depend upon the source of income.'
61
Therefore, as already noted, one important distinction between
itemized and nonitemized deductions is that a taxpayer can use
nonitemized deductions whether or not he claims the standard
Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, sec. 142, § 247, 100 Stat. 2085, 2117-20.
156. Section 22(n)(3) stated, "[t]he deductions allowed by section 23 (other than expenses of
travel, meals, and lodging while away from home) which consist of expenses paid or incurred by the
taxpayer, in connection with the performance by him of services as an employee, under a
reimbursement or other expense allowance arrangement with his employer." See SEIDMAN, supra
note 152, at 1291.
157. Section 22(n)(4) stated, "[t]he deductions.., allowed by section 23 which are attributable to
property held for the production of rents or royalties." See SEIDMAN, supra note 152, at 1290.
158. Section 22(n)(5) stated, "[t]he deductions.., for depreciation and depletion, allowed by
section 23(1) and (m) to a life tenant of property or to an income beneficiary of property held in
trust." See SEIDMAN, supra note 152, at 1293.
159. Section 22(n)(6) stated, "[tihe deductions... allowed by section 23 as losses from the sale
or exchange of property." See SEIDMAN, supra note 152, at 1290.
160. H.R. REP. NO. 78-1365, at 3 (1944), reprinted in SEIDMAN, supra note 152, at 1291.
161. S. REP. No. 78-885, at 24-25 (1944), reprinted in 1944 C.B. 858, 877-78.
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deduction. 62 Conversely, itemized deductions can only be used if the
taxpayer chooses to deduct them in lieu of the standard deduction.
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 introduced miscellaneous itemized
deductions to the tax system by adding § 67(a) to the Code. 163 Section
67(a) further limits a special subset of itemized deductions by allowing
such deductions to be used by an individual taxpayer only to the extent
that the aggregate amount of the deductions exceeds two percent of the
AGI of the taxpayer.' 64 As discussed in more detail below, the Staff of
the Joint Committee on Taxation's description of the provision offered
reasons for adopting miscellaneous itemized deductions: (1) some of the
items included in miscellaneous itemized deductions have elements of
voluntary personal expenditures; 165  (2) typically, the amount of
miscellaneous itemized deduction expenditures incurred by a taxpayer
are small and do not warrant the expenditure of time and energy of the
taxpayer or the government to deal with the reporting and administration
of those deductions, a problem amplified by the fact that taxpayers
applied the tax law incorrectly when deducting certain expenses. 166
162. See supra notes 20-21 & 39-40 and accompanying text.
163. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, sec. 132, ch. I.B.I, 100 Stat. 2085, 2113-16
(adding § 67 to original Chapter 1, Subchapter B, Part I.).
164. This final version was a compromise between the House version, which would have
imposed a one-percent floor on miscellaneous itemized deductions; and the Senate version, which
would have completely eliminated most miscellaneous itemized deductions. H.R. REP. NO. 99-841,
vol. II of2, at 32-33 (1986).
165. STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM
ACT OF 1986, at 78-79 (Comm. Print 1987) [hereinafter BLUE BOOK]. The report stated,
Congress concluded that the prior-law treatment of employee business expenses, investment
expenses, and other miscellaneous itemized deductions fostered significant complexity, and
that some of these expenses have characteristics of voluntary personal expenditures....
The use of a deduction floor also takes into account that some miscellaneous expenses are
sufficiently personal in nature that they would be incurred apart from any business or
investment activities of the taxpayer. For example, membership dues paid to professional
associations may serve both business purposes and also have voluntary and personal aspects;
similarly, subscriptions to publications may help taxpayers in conducting a profession and also
may convey personal and recreational benefits. Taxpayers presumably would rent safe deposit
boxes to hold personal belongings such as jewelry even if the cost, to the extent related to
investment assets such as stock certificates, were not deductible.
Id. The Federal Treasury has specifically stated that the cost of renting a safe deposit box for storing
jewelry and other personal effects is not deductible. Treas. Reg. § 1.212-1(f) (as amended in 1975).
Considering the small amount involved and the fact that it might be useful for the Service to know
that the taxpayer has a safe deposit box, this author finds it surprising that the Service would wish to
deny a deduction for any use of a safe deposit box.
166. BLUE BOOK, supra note 165, at 78-79. The report stated,
[flor taxpayers who anticipated claiming such itemized deductions, prior law effectively
required extensive recordkeeping with regard to what commonly are small expenditures.
Washington Law Review Vol. 80:1, 2005
Therefore, Congress intended to simplify the administration of tax law
by allowing a deduction for such items only when the amount is
unusually large. 1
67
Congress added another limitation to most itemized deductions 168 in
the Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1990.169 In that Act, Congress added
Code § 68, which places an overall limitation on all but three itemized
deductions. 170 The House report justified this limitation by stating that
when an individual's income is sufficiently high, the denial of some
deductions will not impair the individual's ability to pay his or her
income tax. 17 ' The report stressed that the limitation was aimed at "high-
income individuals."
' 172
Let us turn to consider the function of the AMT. 173 The first minimum
tax was introduced in the Tax Reform Act of 1969 to address the
concern that some high-income individuals were able to pay little in
Moreover, the fact that small amounts typically were involved presented significant
administrative and enforcement problems for the Internal Revenue Service. These problems
were exacerbated by the fact that taxpayers frequently made errors of law regarding what types
of expenditures were properly allowable under prior law as miscellaneous itemized deductions.
BLUE BOOK, supra note 165, at 78-79.
167. BLUE BOOK, supra note 165, at 78-79. The report stated,
[s]ince many taxpayers incur some expenses that are allowable as miscellaneous itemized
deductions, but these expenses commonly are small in amount, the Congress concluded that the
complexity created by prior law was undesirable. At the same time, the Congress concluded
that taxpayers with unusually large employee business or investment expenses should be
permitted an itemized deduction reflecting that fact ....
Accordingly, the Congress concluded that the imposition of a two-percent floor on
miscellaneous itemized deductions constituted a desirable simplification of the tax law. This
floor will relieve taxpayers of the burden of recordkeeping unless they expect to incur
expenditures in excess of the floor. Also, the percentage floor will relieve the Internal Revenue
Service of the burden of auditing deductions for such expenditures when not significant in
aggregate amount.
BLUE BOOK, supra note 165, at 78-79.
168. This includes miscellaneous itemized deductions that are allowed after applying the Code
§ 67 floor. I.R.C. § 68(d) (2000).
169. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 11103(a), 104 Stat.
1388, 1406.
170. The three itemized deductions excluded from the limitation in Code § 68 are (1) the medical
expense deduction under Code § 213; (2) the deduction for investment interest under Code § 163(d);
and (3) the deduction for casualty and theft losses and wagering losses under Code § 165. I.R.C.
§ 68(c). The apparent reason for these exclusions is that the three items excluded have severe
limitations within the provisions themselves, and presumably Congress felt it would be overkill to
add additional limitations.
171. H.R. REP. NO. 101-881, at 361 (1990).
172. Id.
173. The AMT is described supra Part I.D.4.
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taxes by virtue of using special tax preferences in the Code. 174 The
Senate report on the Act opined that the morale of a sizeable number of
taxpayers who cannot utilize tax reduction Code provisions suffer
because of their perception that an inequity in the Code allows other
taxpayers to bear less than their fair share of the cost of government.
175
The Senate report expressed concern that, unless all taxpayers were seen
as bearing a reasonable share of the cost of government, the self-
assessment tax system, the vitality of which depends upon the goodwill
and cooperation of the public, might collapse due to a lack of public
confidence. 176 Congress intended the AMT to limit the amount of tax
preferences that a taxpayer can enjoy. 177 Tax commentators also have
described the AMT as a backstop designed to ensure that those with too
many special tax benefits still pay some federal tax.
178
There is no legislative history as to why miscellaneous itemized
deductions are denied for purposes of the AMT. Professor Deborah A.
Geier, focusing on the legislative history of the Tax Reform Act of 1986,
has argued that the exclusion rests on reasoning similar to the
justification for detrimental treatment of the deductions under the
"regular" tax system-i.e., Congress doubts the legitimacy of the
174. BORIS I. BITTKER & MARTIN J. MCMAHON, JR., FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF
INDIVIDUALS 45.1 (2d ed. 1995).
175. S. REP. NO. 91-552, at 13 (1969), reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2027, 2040.
176. Id.
177. Id. The report stated,
[t]he fact that the present law permits a small minority of high-income individuals to escape tax
on a large proportion of their income has seriously undermined the belief of taxpayers that
others are paying their fair share of the tax burden. It is essential that tax reform be obtained
not only as a matter of justice but also as a matter of taxpayer morale. Our individual and
corporate income taxes, which are the mainstays of our tax system, depend upon
self-assessment and the cooperation of taxpayers. The loss of confidence on their part in the
fairness of the tax system could result in a breakdown of taxpayer morale and make it far more
difficult to collect the necessary revenues. For this reason alone, the tax system should be
improved.
Id.
178. KAHN, supra note 19, at 545. As Professor Douglas Kahn wrote,
[m]any of the deductions authorized by the Code do not relate to an accurate determination of
the amount of net income earned from income-producing activity as much as they establish tax
incentives to encourage or reward a taxpayer for investing in certain areas deemed desirable by
Congress. However, Congress felt that virtually all citizens should share the burdensome cost
of taxation to some extent; and, therefore, a taxpayer should not be permitted to enjoy an
amount of such tax advantages that is out of proportion to the taxpayer's economic income.
Accordingly, Congress imposed special taxes on those taxpayers with an excessive amount of
such tax advantages.
KAHN, supra note 19, at 545.
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deductions. 179 The overall limitation of Code § 68, which can eliminate
as much as eighty percent of most of a taxpayer's itemized deductions,
lends credence to Professor Geier's suggestion. However, focusing on
the legislative history of the AMT, one could also conclude that
Congress views the miscellaneous itemized deductions as "tax
advantages" or "tax preferences" for which no taxpayer should obtain
too much benefit.
180
In sum, there is no principled justification for the overall limitation on
itemized deductions. It is purely a backdoor approach to increasing tax
liability on higher-bracket taxpayers.' 8 1 In other words, it is a device to
raise tax rates without changing the nominal rates. While it is
appropriate for Congress to decide whether to raise tax rates, it should
do so directly rather than through a circuitous method so that the
decision will be subject to public scrutiny.
B. Business Versus Personal Expenses: The Original Justification?
When Congress introduced the concept of itemized deductions in the
Individual Income Tax Act of 1944, the defining distinction between
nonitemized and itemized deductions might have been that nonitemized
deductions were business expenses. The House Ways and Means
Committee itself, in its report on the Act, stated, "It will be seen,
therefore, that in general adjusted gross income means gross income less
business deductions. 182 However, the term "business deductions" does
not accurately describe even the original group of nonitemized
deductions. The deductions originally classified as nonitemized included
"deductions attributable to rents and royalties," "depreciation and
depletion deductions of life tenants and income beneficiaries of trusts,"
and "losses from sales or exchanges of property." 183 Obviously, the
original category of nonitemized deductions was broader than just
business expenses. Moreover, not all business expenses were included,
179. Geier, supra note 1, at 534 ("The complete denial of miscellaneous itemized deductions
under the alternative minimum tax has no specific legislative history explaining it but likely rests on
similar premises: doubts about the legitimacy of the deductions.").
180. See supra notes 173-78 and accompanying text.
181. Some commentators have reached the same conclusion. See, e.g., Robert J. Peroni, Reform
in the Use of Phase-Outs and Floors in the Individual Income Tax System, 91 TAx NOTES 1415,
1425-26 (2001) ("This is another way of saying that the purpose of section 68 was to raise effective
tax rates on higher-income taxpayers in a nontransparent fashion.").
182. H.R. REP. NO. 78-1365, at 3 (1944).
183. See supra notes 154-59 and accompanying text.
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because most unreimbursed employee expenses did not make the list.184
The Senate Finance Committee's report on the Individual Income Tax
Act of 1944 provides a better description of the unifying characteristic of
nonitemized deductions:
Fundamentally, the deductions thus permitted to be made from
gross income in arriving at adjusted gross income are those
which are necessary to make as nearly equivalent as practicable
the concept of adjusted gross income, when that concept is
applied to different types of taxpayers deriving their income
from varying sources.
185
Looking at this legislative history and reviewing the group that Congress
originally classified as nonitemized deductions, it appears that Congress
believed that AGI should reflect those expenses that have a strong nexus
to the production of income. 86 Those expenses are central to the
determination of net income.
This distinction among deductions appears to make sense and appears
to be a useful tool for comparing taxpayers and reducing the
administrative burden. The application of tax rates to gross income
would penalize taxpayers engaged in a business with high costs. The
Haig-Simons definition of income, the theoretical "ideal ,,187 implicitly
allows a deduction for the cost of producing income-i.e., our tax
system is built on the concept of taxing net income rather than gross
income. 188 To the extent that AGI excludes items that relate more to
differences in disposable income than to the production of income, that
figure provides a useful base for comparing taxpayers' income status.
The fact that many itemized deductions are unrelated to the cost of
184. Only employee travel and lodging expenses were classified as nonitemized. As noted above,
Congress deleted nonitemized classification for these expenses in 1986. See supra note 155.
185. S. REP. No. 78-885, at 24-25 (1944).
186. Concededly, the list did not adhere perfectly to that standard. For example, unreimbursed
employee expenses were designated as itemized. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
187. See Marjorie E. Komhauser, The Constitutional Meaning of Income and the Income
Taxation of Gifts, 25 CONN. L. REV. 1, 28 (1992); Daniel N. Shaviro, Selective Limitations on Tax
Benefits, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1189, 1202 (1989). Although it has been described as the ideal, no one
has ever seriously proposed a strict application to the federal income tax system.
188. Henry Simons stated, "Personal income may be defined as the algebraic sum of (1) the
market value of rights exercised in consumption and (2) the change in value of the store of property
rights between the beginning and end of the period in question." HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL
INCOME TAXATION 50 (Univ. of Chi. Press 1980) (1938); see also Shaviro, supra note 187, at 1202
("[The Haig-Simons definition of income] requires netting, or the subtraction from gross income of
expenses other than those incurred for consumption.").
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producing income does not make them illegitimate allowances.189
However, it does mean that another justification must be found to
support their inclusion in our tax system. Without going into details, the
Haig-Simons definition of income has served to justify many of these
deductions for some commentators. 90 The Haig-Simons definition of
income is personal consumption plus accumulation of wealth.1 91
Therefore, some commentators contend that many deductions are
appropriate because they are not consumption items as the term is used
in that definition.' 
92
In 1944, Congress first distinguished itemized from nonitemized
deductions in order to promote administrative ease and simplicity.' 93 The
idea, however imperfectly carried out, was to leave intact most of the
income-connected deductions, but to substitute a standard deduction for
itemized deductions when their aggregate amount was relatively
189. Take a simple example: A is in the retail business and his gross receipts (minus basis) are
one million dollars, but his business expenses are $500,000. B is an investor who earns $500,000
and has no investment expenses. Assuming each taxpayer has no other deductible expenses, it is
appropriate to tax A and B equally, because their net income is the same. However, if B's house,
which had a basis and fair market value of $200,000, was destroyed by fire that year and B was not
insured, one might well conclude that A and B would not be on an equal tax plane in that
circumstance. While B's loss does not relate to the production of income, it does reflect differences
in financial status that one might wish to take into account in determining tax liability. While B's
loss is not at the central core of income measurement, it is not necessarily irrelevant, and Congress
can legitimately decide whether to allow a deduction for B's loss.
190. See, e.g., William D. Andrews, Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86 HARv. L.
REv. 309 (1972).
191. See SIMONS, supra note 188, at 50.
192. See, e.g., Andrews, supra note 188, at 345-49 (1972) (arguing charitable contribution is not
contrary to neutral tax principles because taxpayer is not consuming or accumulating donated
money or property).
One might argue that all legitimate deductions should be listed as nonitemized. That is, if
Congress had a principled, as opposed to a programmatic, purpose in allowing a deduction, should
not that deduction also be allowed when determining adjusted gross income? If adjusted gross
income is a useful tool for comparing taxpayers, should not it take into account any principled
deduction? All valid deductions should be allowed for some comparison purposes, but perhaps the
most important comparison takes place after computing adjusted gross income. Legitimate, non-
income-connected expenses should be taken into account in determining taxable income-i.e.,
determining the taxpayer's final tax liability. They are not necessarily required to be allowed for
other tax purposes, such as the phasing out of allowances or credits.
193. See Individual Income Tax Act of 1944, Pub. L. No. 78-315, ch. 210, § 9(a), 58 Stat. 231,
236-37. Professors Bittker and McMahon report,
[i]n 1944, Congress enacted a so-called standard deduction, designed to simplify the
preparation and audit of individual tax returns by requiring taxpayers to choose between
itemizing their personal deductions and deducting a flat allowance in lieu of any itemized
deductions to which they were entitled.
BITTKER & MCMAHON, supra note 174, at 21.4[l].
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small. 194 To the extent that this was inequitable, Congress erred on the
side of allowing too large a deduction for taxpayers using the standard
deduction when they had little or no itemized deductions; but, in this
author's view, any such inequity was minor and more than compensated
by the reduction of administrative cost for both the taxpayers and the
government.
Although, as originally enacted, the amount of the discrepancy in tax
consequences between the treatment of itemized and nonitemized
deductions was fairly small, over time, Congress has greatly expanded
the significance of being classified in one category or another. First,
Congress introduced harsh limitations, such as Code § 67 and § 68, with
respect to itemized deductions, but not with respect to nonitemized
deductions. 195 Further, the AMT system does not allow many itemized
deductions in calculating alternative minimum taxable income.
196
Second, the original principle behind making the classification (to
distinguish expenses tied to the production of income) has become
muddled by the inclusion of items in both categories for quite different
reasons. 197 Finally, the dollar amount of taxes caused by the wrongful
designation of some expenses as itemized deductions has greatly
expanded, and it is even confiscatory in some cases.1 98
Before identifying the items that are improperly characterized under
current tax law and reflecting on their significance, let us turn to the
question of whether the current limitations on itemized deductions are
justified. An evaluation of the strength of the possible justifications for
imposing those limitations provides a useful backdrop to the
consideration of the significance of improper characterization. If the case
for the limitations is weak, the injustice of misclassification is even more
pronounced.
As discussed in detail below, this author concurs with a number of
commentators who have criticized the current limitations on itemized
194. The original standard deduction was not a fixed dollar amount, but a percentage of gross
income subject to a ceiling of a fixed amount. For a brief history of the standard deduction, see
Allan J. Samansky, Nonstandard Thoughts About the Standard Deduction, 1991 UTAH L. REv. 531,
532-40. For an economic discussion of the standard deduction and the use of floors in the Internal
Revenue Code, see generally Louis Kaplow, The Standard Deduction and Floors in the Income Tax,
50 TAX L. REV. 1 (1994).
195. See I.R.C. § 68 (2000).
196. I.R.C. § 56(b)(1).
197. See infra Part IV.
198. See, e.g., Sager & Cohen, supra note 3, at 1078 ("If the ratio of attorney's fees to the entire
recovery is high enough, a before-tax gain may metamorphose into an after-tax loss.").
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deductions; 199 after all, the existence of these limitations make the
wrongful designation of certain expenses so egregious. However
desirable it might seem to repeal the limitations, repeal does not appear
likely to occur in the near future. It is for this reason that this Article
addresses the identification of items that have been improperly subjected
to the limitations. If these, or similar, limitations are retained in the
Code, it becomes vital to examine the items in each category to
determine whether they belong there.
C. Section 68-The Stealth Tax Increase
The legislative history of Code § 68 suggests that Congress did not
attempt to propose a principled justification for the overall limitation on
itemized deductions. The House report stated that it is appropriate to
raise taxes on those individuals that have AGI higher than a certain
amount:
The committee determined that it is appropriate to impose a
limitation on otherwise deductible expenses of individual
taxpayers with AGI exceeding $100,000. The higher an
individual's AGI, the less likely it is that an otherwise
deductible expense will significantly affect the individual's
ability to pay income taxes.2°0
The most direct way to raise taxes is to increase marginal rates, not
phase out deductions. It seems that Congress was fearful of the political
fallout from raising tax rates and therefore chose the phase-out as a
"stealth increase" in tax.
This use of the phase-out is bad policy on several counts. First, taxes
should be as transparent as possible so that the public comprehends the
extent of its burden, allowing it to make informed decisions about
whether that burden is too much, too little, or just right.2°' If Congress is
too afraid to explain to the public why taxes must be raised, it should not
raise them at all. As Professor Robert J. Peroni stated, "[s]ection 68 was
a political gimmick designed to mask the real level of tax increases
being enacted into law. Such a gimmick should be beneath the national
199. See, e.g., Peroni, supra note 181, at 1425-26 (stating purpose of § 68 was to raise effective
tax rates on higher-income taxpayers in nontransparent fashion).
200. H.R. REP. No. 101-881, at 361 (1990).
201. See HENRY C. SIMONS, FEDERAL TAX REFORM 7 (1943) ("We should seek maximum
directness in federal taxation, i.e., minimal concealment and fullest exposure of his actual dollar tax
burdens to every individual.").
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legislative body of the world's most powerful democratic country.
' ' 02
Second, the tax system should also be as transparent as possible for
planning purposes. The tax system should be understandable to
taxpayers so that they can make informed choices about everyday
decisions. °3 For example, a taxpayer may decide to hire an investment
advisor, believing that such expenses will be fully deductible, only to
find out later that, while such expenses are deductible, they are subject to
severe limitations, including a complete disallowance under the AMT
system. The overall limitation on itemized deductions therefore adds
complexity to the tax system, especially when compared to a
straightforward increase in marginal rates.2°
Third, and most importantly, the overall limitation impinges on
horizontal and vertical equity. 5 The provision applies only to a
taxpayer who has deductions that are subject to the limitation. A
taxpayer with identical income, but who has few or no itemized
deductions, is subjected to a much smaller increase in tax. There seems
scant merit to raising the tax liability of only those who have deductions
that Congress has otherwise determined to be valid for purposes of
determining tax liability; certainly, the legislative history provides no
clue as to a valid purpose for doing so.
In addition to the deficiencies described above, the overall limitation
is inefficient. Congress believed that, as a class, high-income taxpayers
have a disproportionately larger amount of itemized deductions than
lower-income taxpayers; the overall limitation thus targets high-income
taxpayers.20 6 While that belief is almost certainly correct, there likely are
202. Peroni, supra note 181, at 1426.
203. Professor David Bradford has labeled this "transactional complexity," which "referts] to the
problems faced by taxpayers in organizing their affairs so as to minimize their taxes within the
framework of the rules." DAVID F. BRADFORD, UNTANGLING THE INCOME TAx 268 (1986).
204. For a discussion of the application of this principle to the alternative minimum tax system,
see Shaviro, supra note 61, at 1457-58 ("[T]he AMT contributes to 'rule complexity,' making the
tax law harder to understand, both because its general operation (and various of its provisions) may
be impenetrable to the novice, and because it creates confusion about just what the tax law really
says."). However, Shaviro argues that obfuscation can be a virtue where it permits "well-meaning
policymakers to choose better policies." Shaviro, supra note 61, at 1458. To the contrary, it seems
that if they truly are better policies, Congress should not have to hide them in complexity. This
author believes that a truly democratic system does not rest on hiding legislative policies from the
electorate, no matter how benign the motives of the legislature.
205. As noted above, horizontal equity requires that persons in like net income positions pay the
same amount of tax. Vertical equity requires that persons in dissimilar net income positions pay
appropriately dissimilar taxes. See ANDREWS, supra note 14, at 7-8.
206. See Peroni, supra note 181, at 1425-26.
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high-income taxpayers who have few itemized deductions.2 °7 As a result,
the overall limitation on itemized deductions is not a good mechanism
for capturing the income of wealthy taxpayers.
D. Section 67-A "Cure" that Is Worse than the Disease
Section 67, which was adopted as part of the Tax Reform Act of
1986,2°8 imposes a floor of two percent of AGI on all itemized
deductions that are not listed in Code § 67(b). 209 The itemized
deductions that are subject to that floor are referred to as "miscellaneous
itemized deductions." The Blue Book's discussion of the enactment of
that provision suggests several justifications for its adoption.210 As
explained more fully below, none of these justifications stands up well to
a careful examination, and it is difficult to escape the conclusion that the
adoption of that provision was a mistake. Nevertheless, there is no
indication of a movement to repair the provision, and it seems likely to
be retained for the foreseeable future. The absence of a principled
justification for the Code § 67 limitation aggravates the erroneous
inclusion of certain items in the list of deductions that are subject to that
limitation.
1. First Justification: Reducing Administrative Expense
The general explanation in the Blue Book indicates that Congress
believed that Code § 67 would simplify tax administration. The joint
committee staff stated that prior law treatment had "fostered significant
complexity," "required extensive recordkeeping," and "presented
significant administrative and enforcement problems for the Internal
Revenue Service. 2 1 Congress "concluded that the imposition of a two-
percent floor on miscellaneous itemized deductions constituted a
desirable simplification of the tax law."
212
207. For example, many wealthy people retire to communities in states that have no income tax,
such as Florida or Texas, and many purchase homes for cash and so have no mortgage interest
expense.
208. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, sec. 132(a), ch.l.B.I., 100 Stat. 2085, 2113-
15.
209. I.R.C. § 67 (2000).
210. For the pertinent legislative history, see BLUE BOOK, supra note 165, at 78-79; supra notes
165-67 and accompanying text.
211. BLUE BOOK, supra note 165, at 78.
212. BLUE BOOK, supra note 165, at 78.
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From a taxpayer's viewpoint, the simplification theory is overrated.
The committee predicted that "this floor will relieve tax-payers of the
burden of recordkeeping unless they expect to incur expenditures in
excess of the floor., 2 13 However, careful taxpayers will keep track of
such expenditures because they will not know whether their total will
exceed the floor until the end of the tax year. A careful person will keep
track of even a small expenditure because it may prove to be deductible
if he or she incurs unanticipated expenses during the tax year.214
Nevertheless, it is likely that some taxpayers do not maintain records of
such expenses because of the existence of the two-percent floor.215 In
addition, many persons do not keep records because of ignorance or
indolence. Therefore, the justification of reducing the taxpayers'
administrative burden has little merit.
Lessening the administrative burden on the Service provides a more
persuasive argument than lessening the administrative burden on the
taxpayer. Maintaining a floor for miscellaneous itemized deductions
means that taxpayers with a small aggregate amount of such expenses
will not report items that they otherwise would claim as deductions.
With fewer returns containing miscellaneous itemized deductions, the
Service will have fewer miscellaneous itemized deductions to audit.
However, the cure may be worse than the disease. As noted in Part
II.B above, independent contractors are able to deduct business expenses
without a floor limitation.216 This distinction, which has no persuasive
justification, greatly encourages taxpayers to classify themselves as
independent contractors, rather than employees, in order to avoid the
Code § 67 floor limiting their unreimbursed business expenses. Any
administrative convenience gained by the two-percent floor may be
offset by the amount of time and resources that the Service must spend
213. BLUE BOOK, supra note 165, at 78.
214. See Peroni, supra note 181, at 1418.
Section 67 adds to both computational and transactional tax planning complexity by making it
difficult for tax-payers to figure out prior to the end of the tax year whether they will be able to
deduct any of their miscellaneous itemized deductions. Given that fact, many taxpayers will
likely keep records just in case they do exceed the 2 percent floor.
Peroni, supra note 181, at 1418; see also Glenn E. Coven, Congress as Indian-Giver: "Phasing-
Out" Tax Allowances Under the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, 6 VA. TAX REV. 505, 527 (1987)
("[B]enefits must be offset by the complexity and manipulation created by plans to avoid the new
floor.").
215. See Deborah H. Schenk, Simplification for Individual Taxpayers: Problems and Proposals,
45 TAX L. REv. 121, 167 n.235 (1989) ("The floor is high enough that most taxpayers no longer
keep records.").
216. I.R.C. § 62(a)(1) (2000).
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auditing and litigating the issue of whether a taxpayer is an employee or
independent contractor. 217
Taxpayers are litigating the independent contractor issue. For
example, in Beitel v. Commissioner,218 an unpublished summary opinion
of the Tax Court, the taxpayer was an adjunct professor at the University
of Idaho. The taxpayer contended that he was an independent contractor
in his teaching position and thus deducted his teaching expenses as a
nonitemized deduction.219  The Service argued (correctly) that the
taxpayer was an employee of the university, and therefore his
unreimbursed expenses were miscellaneous itemized deductions subject
to the two-percent floor of Code § 67.220 This is a revealing case, not
because it is unusual for the Service to litigate this particular issue, 221 but
rather because the amount of the deficiency was only $126.222 It seems
unlikely that the provision provides much administrative relief to the
Internal Revenue Service if it has to spend resources litigating over
$126.
Weighed against the income tax benefits of independent contractor
status are the greater social security taxes that independent contractors
217. See Peroni, supra note 181, at 1418. Peroni stated that,
[fqrom the IRS perspective, it will be faced with the need to expand resources checking the
taxpayer's computation of the floor, issuing a notice of additional tax due to mathematical or
clerical error, and checking on the validity of deductions claimed in excess of the 2 percent
floor and on claims by taxpayers that they are independent contractors whose business
expenses are not subject to the floor.
Peroni, supra note 181, at 1418. Note that the troubling distinction between employees and
independent contractors is not completely solved by merely abolishing the Code § 67 floor. The
distinction will still be important if employee expenses remain an itemized deduction because a
taxpayer will only use itemized deductions if they exceed the standard deduction. Such deductions
could also be subject to the overall limitation on itemized deductions under Code § 68. However, as
Professor Peroni noted, the removal of the floor would lessen the importance of the distinction.
Peroni, supra note 181, at 1424. Note that one reason that the standard deduction is increased from
time to time is to lower the number of returns that are subject to audit.
218. T.C. Summ. Op. 2001-101, No. 17769-99S, 2001 Tax Ct. Summ. LEXIS 205 (T.C. July 5,
2001).
219. Seeid. at *4.
220. Id.
221. For additional cases that involve the issue of whether a taxpayer was an independent
contractor or employee for purposes of determining the classification of business expenses, see
generally Alford v. United States, 116 F.3d 334 (8th Cir. 1997); Weber v. Comm'r, 60 F.3d 1995
(4th Cir. 1995); Butts v. Comm'r, 49 F.3d 713 (1 1th Cir. 1995); Naughton v. Comm'r, 84 T.C.M.
(CCH) 275 (2002); Greene v. Comm'r, 72 T.C.M. (CCH) 1406 (1996); Hathaway v. Comm'r, 72
T.C.M. (CCH) 460 (1996); Potter v. Comm'r, 68 T.C.M. (CCH) 248 (1994); Smithwick v. Comm'r,
68 T.C.M. (CCH) 1545 (1993).
222. Beitel, 2001 Tax Court Summ. LEXIS 205, at *2.
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bear because they are classified as self-employed.223 The increase in
social security taxes makes it undesirable to obtain independent
contractor status in some cases. If the income tax benefit exceeds the
additional social security tax cost, independent contractor status will be
desirable. However, the amount of additional social security taxes will
not always be the proper figure for comparison. Even when the increase
in social security taxes is greater than the income tax benefit, the
"clients" of an independent contractor will not have to pay social
security taxes on his behalf,224 so the taxpayer may be able to obtain a
larger amount of compensation for his work. In that case, some of the
additional social security tax will be offset by the additional amount of
225
compensation.
Also note that Code § 67 has aggravated the complexity of the tax law
because it has induced courts to reach for convoluted reasons not to
apply that provision where its application would cause harsh and
unwarranted consequences. The contingent attorney's fee controversy is
one obvious example. As previously noted, the correct theoretical tax
result, and the result finally reached by the U.S. Supreme Court's
resolution of this issue, is for individuals to include the award in their
226income and take a deduction for the entire fee paid to the attorney.
However, because the expense is a miscellaneous itemized deduction,
and therefore subject to the limitations of Code § 67 and the AMT, some
courts have resorted to dubious legal analysis in order to avoid the
227 adiin
application of those provisions. In addition, at least one state
legislature has replaced its lien statute for the express purpose of
preventing the overtaxation of plaintiffs who have executed a contingent
223. The total rate of self-employment tax (including the hospital insurance tax) is 15.3%. The
total rate of employee tax on wages (including the hospital insurance tax) is 7.65%. I.R.C. § 3101
(2000).
224. Id. § 3101.
225. Also, note that the cost of independent contractor classification is mitigated by the fact that
one-half of the portion of the tax that is attributable to Medicare is a nonitemized deduction. Id.
§ 164(0.
226. See supra Part II.A.
227. See Banks v. Comm'r, 345 F.3d 373, 386 (6th Cir. 2003), rev'd, Comm'r v. Banks, Nos.
03-892, 03-907, U.S.-, 2005 WL 123825 (Jan. 24, 2005); Banaitis v. Comm'r, 340 F.3d 1074,
1083 (9th Cir. 2003), rev'd sub noma. Comm'r v. Banks, Nos. 03-892, 03-907, U.S.-, 2005 WL
123825 (Jan. 24, 2005); see also Polsky, Fruits and Trees, supra note 1, at 74-76. The expense is
also subject to the limitation imposed by Code § 68, but the presence of Code § 67 and the
alternative minimum tax likely added considerable weight to some courts' dissatisfaction with the
law's treatment of those expenses.
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fee contract. 228 It seems undesirable for state laws to be reshaped for the
exclusive purpose of curing only one aspect of a problem engendered by
a failing in the tax law. The old adage that bad facts make bad law can
be turned around to say that "bad law engenders a confused legal
structure., 229 It seems that Code § 67 may have created more complexity
and administrative problems than it has solved.
In any event, the Service could achieve the administrative advantage
of a reduced audit pool without resorting to a floor on miscellaneous
itemized deductions. The Service could simply adopt a policy of not
auditing returns where the amounts of those deductions are small. In
such instances, which are quite common, it is not worth the Service's
time to audit returns solely for the purpose of confirming the deductions.
The cost of adopting such a policy is that once it becomes known by
taxpayers that their returns are unlikely to be audited, the taxpayers will
have less constraint to cheat, or, at least, to adopt aggressive positions.
That cost may be rendered less significant by the fact that currently the
likelihood of an audit of a return with a small amount of itemized
deductions is very small.230 Even if the floor is deemed a more effective
means of reducing the Service's audit burden, cases in which the
taxpayer suffers great inequity as a result of the floor, such as the
attorney's fee problem, should be exempted.
2. Second Justification: Personal Expenditures
In addition to lessening the taxpayer's administrative burden, another
228. In June 2004, the State of Washington enacted a new attorneys' lien law. WASH. REV. CODE
§ 60.40.010 (2004). The purpose of the new law is to
end double taxation of attorneys' fees obtained through judgments and settlements, whether
paid by the client from the recovery or by the defendant pursuant to a statute or a contract.
Through this legislation, Washington law clearly recognizes that attorneys have a property
interest in their clients' cases so that the attorney's fee portion of an award or settlement may
be taxed only once and against the attorney who actually receives the fee. This statute should
be liberally construed to effectuate its purpose. This act is curative and remedial, and intended
to ensure that Washington residents do not incur double taxation on attorneys' fees received in
litigation and owed to their attorneys.
Attorneys' Liens, ch. 73, § 1, 2004 Wash. Laws 269; see also Wood, supra note 100, at 736-37
(discussing Washington State law on attorney's fee issue).
229. As it does not roll off the tongue easily, this author does not expect that this will become a
popularly used statement.
230. In fiscal year 2000, the overall audit rate for individuals was 0.49%. INTERNAL REVENUE
SERVICE, STATEMENT BY IRS COMMISSIONER CHARLES 0. RoSsoTTI ON AUDIT AND COLLECTION
ACTIVITY FOR FISCAL 2000, 2001 TAX NOTES TODAY 33-11 (Feb. 15, 2001). For an interesting
discussion of voluntary taxpayer compliance, see generally Leandra Lederman, Tax Compliance
and the Reformed IRS, 51 KAN. L. REV. 971 (2003).
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justification offered for the miscellaneous itemized deduction floor is
that "some of the expenses have characteristics of voluntary personal
expenditures., 231 The joint committee staff stated that the "use of a
deduction floor also takes into account that some miscellaneous
expenses are sufficiently personal in nature that they would be incurred
apart from any business or investment activities of the taxpayer." 232 If
only some have personal aspects, the justification for including others
must rest on different grounds.
Congress has arbitrarily drawn limitations in other parts of the Code
where expenditures have mixed business and personal elements. For
example, Code § 274(n) allows a deduction for only fifty percent of the
cost of business meals.233 However, the reasoning behind that floor is
much stronger than it is for miscellaneous itemized deductions because it
is obvious that there are personal benefits derived from the meal. The
meals satisfy nutritional needs. Congress decided to draw an arbitrary
line and allow fifty percent of each business meal as a deduction. With
miscellaneous itemized deductions, however, personal benefits are not as
obvious, and in fact seem nonexistent in certain cases.
It is interesting to contrast the treatment of the reimbursement of the
cost of an employee's business meal with the reimbursement of other
employee business expenses. If an employer reimburses the cost of a
business meal to an employee, the employee can exclude the entire
reimbursement from income, even though no more than half the cost
would have been deductible if there were no reimbursement.234 Although
the meal retains the personal element regardless of whether it is
reimbursed by the employer, the employee can exclude the entire
amount. However, the Code § 274(n) limitation then applies to the
employer. That is, the employer can take a deduction for only half the
cost of the reimbursed meal. The Code therefore treats the employer as
taking advantage of the personal element of the meal, even though it is
the employee who enjoyed the food.235 Thus, the limitation is overbroad
231. BLUE BOOK, supra note 165, at 78.
232. BLUE BOOK, supra note 165, at 78 (emphasis added). The joint committee staff lists
publication subscriptions and safe deposit boxes (holding both investment and personal assets) as
examples of expenditures that could be a mixture of business and personal. BLUE BOOK, supra note
165, at 78.
233. I.R.C. § 274(n) (2000). Another example (relating to charitable rather than business
expenditures) is that a taxpayer may take a deduction for only eighty percent of the amount donated
to a university if the donation gives the taxpayer the right to purchase athletic tickets. Id. § 170(1).
234. Id. § 274(e)(3).
235. While discussing a different issue, Professor Daniel Halperin's article on imputed interest
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in that it can apply to a person or entity that did not receive any personal
benefit from the expenditure. 236
Compare the treatment of a meal reimbursement to the treatment of
reimbursed employee expenses other than meals. If the employer
reimburses the employee, the expense becomes a nonitemized deduction
for the employee.237 The employee may then deduct the full amount,
thereby creating a wash by having income in an amount equal to the
reimbursement from the employer.238 However, unlike the Code
§ 274(n) limitation on meals, the Code § 67 limitation does not apply to
the employer.23 9 Therefore, simply because the employer reimburses the
employee for the expense, the expense magically loses all of its personal
elements. As discussed below, the suggestion that the employer would
reimburse only expenses that have no personal aspects is dubious.
The justification for the two-percent floor based on the personal
nature of miscellaneous itemized deductions is weak. Many business
expenses of self-employed individuals have a personal element; yet
Congress has not applied a floor to those expenses, with only a few
sheds light on the propriety of the tax law's treatment of meals. See generally Daniel I. Halperin,
Interest in Disguise: Taxing the "Time Value of Money," 95 YALE L.J. 506 (1986). Professor
Halperin notes that the system can reach the correct result with regard to "disguised loans" by either
direct taxation (taxing imputed income on such loans), indirect taxation (denying an otherwise
allowable deduction), or substitute taxation (taxing another party to the transaction by denying a
deduction to that party). Id. Although not the same issue, the concepts Halperin discusses can be
applied to the current tax treatment of business meals. When the employee pays for the meal and is
not reimbursed, the tax system engages in indirect taxation by denying a deduction for fifty percent
of the meal. When the employer reimburses the employee for the expense of the meal, the employee
may take a deduction for the entire expense and the employer is now limited to a fifty percent
deduction for the expense. The system engages in substitute taxation of the employee by denying a
deduction to the employer for half the expense. If both parties were in the same tax bracket, the tax
result to the government would be the same. Almost always, however, different rates will apply to
the two parties, and therefore taxpayers can structure the transaction to shift taxation to a lower tax
rate taxpayer.
236. Note that the limitation in Code § 274(n) is also overbroad in that it applies to the cost of the
entire bill, rather than merely the cost of the meal consumed by the payor. For example, A takes B, a
client, out for a business lunch. A pays for both meals. B does not include the value of his meal in
income. The Code § 274(n) fifty-percent limitation applies to the cost A incurred for B's meal even
though A received no personal benefit from that meal. Applying the limitation to both the meals,
however, does make sense for administrative and simplification purposes. The treatment of the cost
of B's meal is analogous to the disallowance of fifty percent of an employer's reimbursement of the
cost of an employee's meal. See I.R.C. § 274(n).
237. Id. §§ 62(a)(2)(A), 274(e)(3).
238. See supra note 126.
239. The employer's reimbursement payment is a nonitemized deduction under I.R.C. § 62(a)(1),
and Code § 67 applies only to itemized deductions. I.R.C. § 67(b).
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limited exceptions. 240 A taxpayer can choose the amount to expend on
business activities and control how enjoyable they will be. The
taxpayer's power to control the nature of the expenditure does not
detract from its business character or its deductibility. If a self-employed
taxpayer travels on business, he or she can travel either first class or
economy class. He or she can rent an attractive office with comfortable
working conditions or choose a more spartan work environment.
Because business is conducted by human beings, it is not always
possible to disentangle the personal element of an expense from the
business element.241 Instead, personal and business elements often are
inexorably entwined. In a few cases, the Code disallows any deduction
(e.g., commuting expenses); 242 in a few others, the Code allows a portion
of the deduction (e.g., business meals); 243 in most circumstances, the
Code allows the entire cost to be deductible. 24
The personal element justification for the two-percent floor does not
apply to many of the items subject to that limitation because many of the
miscellaneous itemized deductions have no personal element
whatsoever. Congress itself recognized that only some miscellaneous
245itemized deductions have a substantial personal element. An obvious
case in point is the attorney's fee problem. Similarly, expenses incurred
for investment counsel or for aid in preparing an income tax form have
no personal element. Therefore, there is no personal element justification
for limiting those deductions. In that regard, Professor Peroni dismissed
the personal element justification and urged instead that those expenses
(and only those expenses) that are generally personal (such as
subscriptions to general interest publications and safe-deposit boxes) be
denied any deduction.246 If the entire category of miscellaneous itemized
240. As discussed above, the fifty-percent limitation on business meals applies to independent
contractors. Id. § 274(n).
241. See Jeffrey H. Kahn, Personal Deductions-A Tax "Ideal" or Just Another "Deal"?, 2002
L. REv. MICH. ST. U.-DETROIT C.L. 1, 30.
242. Treas. Reg. § 1.262-1(b)(5) (as amended in 1972).
243. See I.R.C. § 274(n).
244. For a discussion of several business expenses, see generally Daniel I. Halperin, Business
Deductions for Personal Living Expenses: A Uniform Approach to an Unsolved Problem, 122 U.
PA. L. REv. 859 (1973) (arguing some areas of business expenses are too personal in nature and
deductibility for those types of expenses should be restricted).
245. See BLUE BOOK, supra note 165, at 78.
246. Peroni, supra note 181, at 1420. Professor Peroni stated,
the solution to this problem of taxpayers taking deductions for personal consumption expenses
is to disallow the deduction directly to the extent it does not have a sufficient connection to a
trade or business or investment activity .... If a particular type of expense is generally
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deductions is to be sustained, other justifications will have to be
determined to be sufficient.
Even if the personal nature of miscellaneous itemized deductions is of
legitimate concern, the two-percent floor is an inappropriate solution.
The floor is based on the amount of the taxpayer's AGI.247 To assume
that the proportion of an expense that provides a personal benefit
increases with the rise of a taxpayer's AGI is a highly questionable
proposition. For example, two taxpayers may have the exact same
expense, which is their only miscellaneous itemized deduction.
However, one taxpayer has AGI of $100,000, and one has AGI of
$200,000. The taxpayer with the lower AGI is allowed to claim $2,000
more in miscellaneous itemized deductions, despite the fact that both
expenditures have the same mixture of legitimate and personal
elements.248
This contention does not mean that all floors based on the taxpayer's
AGI are suspect. There are circumstances in which a floor is appropriate.
For example, a taxpayer can only deduct medical expenses that exceed
7.5% of his or her AGI.24 9 Professor Mark Kelman has argued that the
existing medical expense deduction should be removed from the Code
because many medical expenses have personal and pleasurable
elements. 250 The floor, based on the taxpayer's AGI, addresses that
concern.
251
personal in nature (e.g., subscriptions to general interest publications; safe deposit boxes by
individual taxpayers), then a specific disallowance provision relating to the particular expense
may be appropriate. A deduction floor that may or may not disallow the expense having the
predominately personal element and that also disallows other legitimate business or investment
expenses is not the appropriate legislative response to this problem.
Peroni, supra note 181, at 1420.
247. I.R.C. § 67(a) (2000).
248. Note that the fifty-percent floor that Code § 274(n) imposes on meals is not subject to that
objection because the size of that limitation is tied to the amount expended, rather than to the
taxpayer's adjusted gross income.
249. I.R.C. § 213(a).
250. Mark G. Kelman, Personal Deductions Revisited: Why They Fit Poorly in an "Ideal"
Income Tax and Why They Fit Worse in a Far From Ideal World, 31 STAN. L. REV. 831, 874-76
(1979). Examples of such items include an air conditioning unit that would relieve a taxpayer's
medical condition but also provide comfort in hot weather, or a swimming pool, which can provide
both therapeutic and pleasurable benefits. See Kahn, supra note 241, at 30.
251. Kahn, supra note 241, at 29 ("[B]y utilizing a percentage of adjusted gross income as a
floor, rather than adopting a specified floor amount, the tax law reflects the fact that persons with
higher incomes, and thus with larger disposable income, likely will spend more on medical matters
[especially on medical benefits that also provide personal pleasure] than will those with fewer
resources.").
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One might contend that the amount of the personal element of
miscellaneous itemized deduction expenses is correlated with the size of
the taxpayer's AGI. One could argue that those with a greater AGI might
be more willing to pay for items whose business or investment benefit
would not warrant their cost were it not for the personal benefit that they
also provide. Thus, it could be argued that the same reasoning that
justifies the medical expense floor could apply in the case of
miscellaneous itemized deductions.
However, there is an aspect to the use of a floor for the medical
expense deduction that does not apply to miscellaneous itemized
deductions. The graduated tax rates already incorporate an allowance for
some medical expenses each year; that is one of the justifications for
having a zero or low marginal rate for some income levels.252 The
medical expense deduction only comes into play in the case of
extraordinary medical expenses. In those cases, the rate schedule must
be modified by allowing a deduction to account for the fact that the
taxpayer incurred a greater amount of medical expenses than the rate
schedule normally presumes.253 By contrast, the expenses incurred in
producing income are not reflected in the tax rate structure, and so a
floor on the deduction for such items cannot be said to prevent a double
allowance. 4
The personal element justification appears to apply equally to
reimbursed employee expenses or independent contractor expenses, for
which no deduction is disallowed. Congress has attempted to suggest a
rationale for applying different treatments to seemingly comparable
circumstances. In the case of employees, Congress has opined that
employers will reimburse any legitimate trade or business expense, thus
implying that anything not reimbursed is not sufficiently related to the
business and must have personal elements.255 The Senate Finance
252. See Kahn, supra note 241, at 28.
253. See Kahn, supra note 241, at 27-29.
254. See Martin J. McMahon, Jr., Individual Tax Reform for Fairness and Simplicity: Let
Economic Growth Fend for Itself, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 459, 493 (1993) ("Code section 67
cannot be justified on the grounds that nearly all taxpayers have some unreimbursed employee
business expenses or Code section 212 expenses and that only excessive expenses affect the
individual's ability to pay.").
255. Note, however, that sometimes the employee may also be the employer, as in
employee-owned corporations:
Code section 67 also creates a distinction in practice between owner-employees of closely held
corporations and all non-owner employees. Owners of closely held corporations can and do
provide themselves with full reimbursement or direct payment by the corporation, as
excludable working condition fringe benefits. These include not just legitimate business
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Committee stated, "The committee believes that generally it is
appropriate to disallow deduction for employee business expenses
because employers reimburse employees for those expenses that are
most necessary for employment. '' 256  However, many employers
reimburse expenses that have personal elements, such as meals,
magazine subscriptions, and club dues. It also seems likely that many
employers do not reimburse many legitimate business expenses because
they do not wish to undertake a reimbursement plan. As Professor Peroni
noted, "such employers pay their employees a higher salary amount and
make the employees pay and keep track of their own expenses.' 257
Therefore, using employers' reimbursement practices is a poor proxy to
judge whether an expense is primarily a personal or legitimate business
expense.
Moreover, this reliance on an independent overseer to verify a
deduction does not justify the difference in the treatment of independent
contractors and employees. As noted above, any valid business expense
of an independent contractor is a nonitemized deduction and thus is not
subject to the any of the itemized limitations (the overall limitation, the
two-percent floor, or the disallowance of the deduction for AMT
purposes). This is true despite the fact that there is no "independent"
third party reviewing the expenses to determine if they are legitimate (as
there is with reimbursed employee expenses).258 It is difficult to see why
Congress should trust independent contractors more than employees
with these expenses.259
One possible ground for treating independent contractors differently
is that they will have to account for their expenses to their clients, so
expenses, but many mixed purpose expenses, as well as clearly personal expenses. They avoid
even raising the issue of deductibility on their own tax returns.
McMahon, supra note 254, at 493.
256. S. REP. No. 99-313, at 79 (1996); see Blake D. Rubin, Tunneling Under the Two Percent
Floor, 38 TAXNOTES 177, 179 (1988).
257. Peroni, supra note 181, at 1422.
258. See supra text accompanying note 255.
259. Peroni, supra note 18 1, at 1421. Peroni states,
an independent contractor has no employer to account to with respect to business expenses;
yet, such a taxpayer is able to deduct his or her expenses in full in arriving at adjusted gross
income and is not subject to the section 67 floor. It is unclear why Congress believes that
independent contractor taxpayers are less likely to try to disguise personal consumption
expenditures as deductible business expenses than are employees and all the legislative history
of the 1986 act provides no empirical support for such belief.
Peroni, supra note 181, at 1421 (citations omitted); see also McMahon, supra note 254, at 492-93
(stating Congress is "barking up the wrong tree" by focusing on employees rather than independent
contractors and employee-owned businesses).
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there is no administrative inconvenience in having them report those
expenses to the Service. However, independent contractors do not
necessarily have to account to their clients. An independent contractor
may set out a flat or hourly fee for services and personally absorb any
expenses, an allowance for which is incorporated in the size of the fee
charged. In summary, the presence of a personal element in some
business expenditures does not justify a more restrictive treatment of
employee expenses than is accorded to the self-employed.
3. Third Justification: Taxpayers Make Errors in Reporting
Deductions
Another justification offered for the limitation on miscellaneous
itemized deductions is that "taxpayers frequently made errors of law
regarding what types of expenditures were properly allowable ....
That is, Congress questioned the ability of taxpayers to determine which
expenses were allowable and believed that they would inadvertently
misapply the legal rules. The legislative history listed areas where
taxpayers were likely to misapply the law: home office expenses,
education expenses, the cost of safe deposit boxes in which no
income-producing asset is stored, and the cost of subscriptions to
popular magazines that contain business information. 261
This justification is not persuasive. It is not a compelling rationale to
state that because some taxpayers will misinterpret the law, a floor is
required to limit some deductions, but not others. First, taxpayers surely
make mistakes in applying the law in many areas-not just those listed
as miscellaneous itemized deductions. That contention could just as well
justify eliminating any provision that provides a benefit for taxpayers.
Second, not everyone would make mistakes, so not all taxpayers should
be penalized. Third, a floor is not an adequate solution. Taxpayers can
still erroneously claim a deduction when the amounts involved are large
enough. Because the two-percent floor applies to an aggregate of
miscellaneous itemized deductions, the mistaken deduction could be a
very small amount as long as the taxpayer has other expenses that place
him over the two-percent floor. Fourth, just as with the personal element
argument, the mistake of law justification fails to explain the more
favorable treatment accorded to independent contractors. There is no
260. BLUE BOOK, supra note 165, at 78.
261. S. REP. NO. 99-313, at 78 n.18 (1986); see H.R. REP. NO. 99-426, at 109 n.8 (1985); BLUE
BOOK, supra note 165, at 78 n.52.
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apparent basis for a prediction that independent contractors will be better
arbiters of tax rules than employees.262
The current disparity of treatment is unfair and inefficient in that it
induces taxpayers who have significant business expenses to make every
effort to be classified as independent contractors, rather than as
employees.263 The absence of a rationale for the disparate treatment may
generate cynicism among taxpayers. To quote Congress's own
justification for adopting the AMT, a "loss of confidence on [the
taxpayers'] part in the fairness of the tax system could result in a
breakdown of taxpayer morale and make it far more difficult to collect
the necessary revenues. For this reason alone, the tax system should be
improved.
264
4. Fourth Justification: Congress Needs the Additional Revenue
Finally, Code § 67 has been described as a "bald revenue grab by
Congress to make the legislative ledgers balance. 265 Professor Peroni
gives a more positive spin to that purpose by noting that § 67 was part of
a goal of the "Tax Reform Act of 1986 'to reduce tax rates through base-
broadening.' 266 Revenue-raising is a permissible goal of tax legislation.
However, to pass muster as good tax policy, a provision must be
equitable and consistent with cost allocation policy. As noted above, the
two-percent floor limitation on miscellaneous itemized deductions has
no sustainable policy justification, but rather causes inequities. 267
262. One possible response to the complaint of unequal treatment of employees and independent
contractors is that, instead of expanding the deduction to employees, it should be contracted by
denying it to independent contractors and other self-employed persons. It seems highly unlikely that
Congress would so greatly expand the denial of deductions. Even if employees and independent
contractors were treated equally, this author maintains that limitations should not be applied to
business expenses.
263. See supra notes 217-25 and accompanying text.
264. S. REP. No. 91-552, at 13 (1969), reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2027, 2040.
265. See Geier, supra note 1, at 533. At the time of its enactment, the Joint Committee on
Taxation estimated that the provision would raise an additional $19.4 billion over a five year period.
BLUE BOOK, supra note 165, at 1360.
266. See Peroni, supra note 181, at 1418 (quoting S. REP. No. 99-313, at 78 (1986)).
267. The revenue loss from a repeal of Code § 67 could be packaged with an increase in marginal
rates, thus leading to a more equitable tax system while maintaining the revenue required for the
government.
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5. Solution
Having dismissed the proposed justifications for miscellaneous
itemized deductions, what are the possible reforms? There are two
choices: either (1) keep the system, but alter the list of deductions that
are classified as miscellaneous itemized deductions; or (2) repeal the
classification as a whole. At a minimum, some of the items currently
classified as miscellaneous itemized deductions should not be subject to
those restrictions.
IV. TIME FOR REFORM: A PROPOSAL FOR
RECLASSIFICATION OF THE DEDUCTIONS
As discussed above in Part III, this author believes that the arguments
for repealing Code § 67 and § 68 are stronger than those for retaining
them. While other commentators have made this point, 68 the provisions
remain in the Code. Even the overall limitation, which is subject to a
phase-out, will reappear in 2011 if Congress does not make the repeal
permanent.269 If these provisions are to remain, Congress should modify
them by removing from the list of itemized deductions those items that
are directly connected to the production of income or the inclusion of
which contravenes legitimate tax policies. Congress took a modest step
in that direction last year when it adopted the Civil Rights Tax Relief
provision of the 2004 Act, which provides nonitemized deduction
treatment for the attorney's fee and court costs incurred in connection
with claims of employment discrimination and with certain claims
against the government. 7°
Because Congress appears to be unwilling to repeal the limitations in
Code § 67 and § 68, it is time for Congress to review the current
classifications of deductions. Reviewing the entire classification system
and making appropriate changes may obviate the need for Congress or
the courts to adopt piecemeal modifications from time to time as hard
cases emerge. A common response to a patently wrong consequence that
generates a hue and cry is to fix each specific situation while leaving
intact the root cause of the situation. For example, consider the Civil
268. See generally Calvin H. Johnson, Simplification: Replacement of the Section 68 Limitation
on Itemized Deductions, 78 TAx NOTES 89 (1998); Peroni, supra note 181.
269. See supra note 11.
270. See American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 703, 118 Stat. 1418, 1546-
48; infra note 302 and accompanying text.
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Rights Tax Relief provision of the 2004 Act. It was adopted to respond
to the attorney's fee controversy but left unresolved many comparable
circumstances in which a similar issue arises.27'
This Part proposes that Congress reclassify certain deductions. The
items discussed in this Part are not an exhaustive list of the items that
should be reclassified, but are five egregious examples of changes that
need to be made, several of which were noted in the examples discussed
in Part II. Highlighting these examples will hopefully induce Congress
to implement a commission to study the entire classification system
rather than rest on its laurels for solving one small part of the problem
with the 2004 legislation.
A. Expenses for Production of Income-Code § 212
Code § 212 allows a deduction for individuals for all ordinary and
necessary expenses paid or incurred: "(1) for the production or collection
of income; (2) for the management, conservation, or maintenance of
property held for the production of income; or (3) in connection with the
determination, collection, or refund of any tax. 272 Code § 212 is
sometimes referred to as a "nonbusiness" deduction provision because it
applies to income-producing activities that do not qualify as a trade or
business. 273 Most, but not all, deductions allowed under Code § 212 are
classified as miscellaneous itemized deductions.274 On account of that
classification, there are many circumstances where the operation of the
limitations under Code § 67 and § 68 or the AMT system leads to
inequitable tax results.
The contingent attorney's fee problem is a dramatic example. The
payment to the attorney should be fully deductible by the plaintiff so that
the plaintiff is taxed on a net, rather than a gross, amount. However,
because the payment is deductible under either Code § 212 or Code
§ 162275 and is not listed as a nonitemized deduction unless the claim
271. See American Jobs Creation Act, § 703; infra note 302 and accompanying text.
272. I.R.C. § 212 (2000).
273. There are other nonbusiness deduction provisions. For example, I.R.C. § 167(a)(2) allows
depreciation deductions for property held for the production of income. Id. § 167(a)(2).
274. I.R.C. § 212 expenses attributable to property held for the production of rents and royalties
are classified as nonitemized. Id. § 62(a)(4); see infra notes 306-07 and accompanying text.
275. The fee may be deductible as a trade or business expense under Code § 162(a) if the
litigation arises out of the employee's employment. Because the expenses are not reimbursed, they
will be classified as miscellaneous itemized deductions and subject to the described limitations. As
noted infra Part IV.B, this author believes that employee trade or business expenses should be
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involves employment discrimination or is otherwise listed in Code
§ 62(a)(19), it is subject to the limitations of Code § 67 and § 68, and
completely disallowed for purposes of the AMT.
Not only does this situation cause some taxpayers to suffer grossly
unfair tax consequences, it has led some courts, motivated by concerns
for the plight of some taxpayers, to adopt a spurious line of legal
reasoning in a flawed effort to cure the problem. 76 In doing so, many
courts have sought to utilize lien rules, which differ among the states.
277
Because of those differences and because of the faulty reasoning of
those decisions that favored taxpayers, taxpayers have lost in the
majority of those cases and, most recently, in the U.S. Supreme Court.27 8
Even if the taxpayers had prevailed in the Supreme Court under the state
lien argument, the Court's holding would have been of no use to
taxpayers in circumstances where the item in question is not a contingent
fee for a third party. Even if the U.S. Supreme Court had upheld the
taxpayer's case on different grounds, it would likely have had to rely on
a misapplication of tax principles in order to achieve that result. Bad
decisions nevertheless become precedents that can apply to quite
different circumstances. Courts will not necessarily restrict application
of the precedent to situations where a taxpayer's plight is sympathetic.
If, contrary to its holding for the Service, sympathy for the taxpayers'
plight had led the Supreme Court to join a minority of the lower courts
and reach a favorable result for the taxpayers, that choice could have led
to decisions in future cases that would improperly tax other parties.279
classified as nonitemized. Correct classification of both categories will solve the attorney's fee
dilemma, whether the deduction is allowable under Code § 212 or Code § 162. Note that the amount
of damages awarded that equals the amount payable to the attorney does not constitute a
reimbursement to the plaintiff of that expense, and does not qualify that expense for nonitemization
treatment.
276. See, e.g., Banks v. Comm'r, 345 F.3d 373, 386 (6th Cir. 2003), rev'd, Comm'r v Banks,
Nos. 03-892, 03-907, _.U.S._ 2005 WL 123825 (Jan. 24, 2005); Banaitis v. Comm'r, 340 F.3d
1074, 1083 (9th Cir. 2003), rev'd sub nom. Comm'r v. Banks, Nos. 03-892, 03-907, -U.S. , 2005
WL 123825 (Jan. 24, 2005); see also Polsky, Fruits and Trees, supra note 1, at 74-76 (stating the
minority view that a plaintiff excludes income paid to the attorney is based on faulty analysis).
277. Some courts have used a partnership approach to exclude the attorney's fee from the
plaintiff's income. See Polsky, Fruits and Trees, supra note 1, at 111-19; supra note 70.
278. See, e.g., Comm'r v. Banks, Nos. 03-892, 03-907, __U.S._, 2005 WL 123825 (Jan. 24,
2005); Raymond v. United States, 355 F.3d 107 (2d Cir. 2004), petition for cert. filed, 72 U.S.L.W.
1437 (U.S. Apr. 9, 2004) (No. 03-6037); Campbell v. Comm'r, 274 F.3d 1312 (10th Cir. 2001);
Kenseth v. Comm'r, 259 F.3d 881, 883 (7th Cir. 2001); Young v. Comm'r, 240 F.3d 369, 379 (4th
Cir. 2001); Baylin v. United States, 43 F.3d 1451 (Fed. Cir. 1995); O'Brien v. Comm'r, 319 F.2d
532 (3d Cir. 1963).
279. For example, consider the potential consequences from a holding that attorney's fees
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Banaitis v. Commissioner, one of the two cases that the U.S. Supreme
Court decided for the Service, provides a good example of the problem.
Banaitis retained a law firm on a contingent fee basis in order to take
legal action against two parties-the corporate owner of his former
employer for wrongful interference with his employment and his former
employer for wrongful discharge. 280 Banaitis's suit was not based on a
claim of discrimination. The parties settled the lawsuit for approximately
$8,700,000; pursuant to the contingent fee arrangement, the law firm
received approximately $3 ,800,000.281
On his tax return, Banaitis excluded all of the damages awarded to
him on the contention that they were for physical injuries and therefore
were excluded from gross income by Code § 104(a)(2).282 The Service
contended that all of the damages were includable in income. 283 The
Ninth Circuit agreed that the physical damage exclusion did not apply;284
but, reversing the Tax Court, it held that Banaitis was not required to
incurred in a suit to collect on a claim should be capitalized and offset against the amount collected,
rather than treating the fees as a deductible expense. See supra note 66 (discussing the "Davenport"
approach). Congress expressly provided an ordinary deduction (as contrasted to a capital loss
deduction) for expenses incurred for the "collection of income" (emphasis added). I.R.C. § 212(1)
(2000). Treasury Regulation § 1.212-1(k) makes it clear that attorney's fees incurred in collecting
rent, even when incurred in a suit to determine whether the taxpayer has title to the property that
produced the rent, are deductible expenses. Treas. Reg. § 1.212-1(k) (as amended in 1975). Thus, if
a taxpayer incurs expenses in collecting income that will be treated as a capital gain, the Code
permits the taxpayer a deduction from ordinary income for those expenses. If the capitalization
approach is adopted, those expenses will offset the capital gains income and effectively will be
treated as capital losses. That treatment will disfavor a taxpayer in some circumstances and favor a
taxpayer in other circumstances, but in neither case will it comply with the congressional direction
to provide ordinary deduction treatment as set forth in I.R.C. § 212(1).
If a taxpayer's claim for capital gain damages arose out of a business operated by a
self-employed individual, the attorney's fees should be nonitemized ordinary deductions. I.R.C.
§ 162(a)(1). If the claim arose in connection with property held for the production of rent, the
attorney's fees again should be nonitemized ordinary deductions. Id. § 62(a)(4). The Davenport
approach would alter those expenses into capital losses, which may be far less useful to the
taxpayer. If the taxpayer's claim is for lost wages, the deduction for the attorney's fees would be a
miscellaneous itemized deduction subject to limitations. However ill-advised those limitations may
be, they were deliberately imposed by Congress, and only Congress has the power to remove them.
While the Davenport approach will negate the limitations that Congress imposed on such expenses,
it will contravene the will of the legislature, and it will avoid those limitations in only one narrow
area in which they apply (which became even narrower after the congressional relief provided for
many employee suits by the 2004 Act).
280. Banaitis, 340 F.3d at 1077.
281. Id. at 1078.
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. Id. at 1079-81.
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include the portion of damages paid to the law firm in income
285
(thereby avoiding the miscellaneous itemized deduction limitations). The
Ninth Circuit stated that
[t]he question of whether attorneys fees paid under a contingent
fee contract with a plaintiff are includable in the plaintiff's gross
income involves two related questions: (1) how state law defines
the attorney's rights in the action, and (2) how federal tax law
operates in light of this state law definition of interests.
286
Oregon State law applied in Banaitis,287 and the Ninth Circuit
determined that Oregon State provided attorneys with a sufficient
property interest in contingent fees to justify a holding that the fee paid
to the attorney should not be included in the taxpayer's gross income.288
Essentially, the Ninth Circuit treated the contingent fee agreement as
an assignment by Banaitis to his attorneys of a portion of his claim
against the defendant. Even if the agreement constituted an assignment
of part of the taxpayer's claim, it should not prevent Banaitis from being
taxed on the entire amount of the settlement. The "assignment" was not
made gratuitously; it was a commercial exchange in which Banaitis
received the right to the attorney's services. In a commercial exchange,
the taxpayer must recognize gain to the extent that the amount he
realized exceeded his adjusted basis28 9 in the portion of the claim that he
"sold. 2 90 Because the taxpayer's basis in the claim likely will be zero,291
the entire amount realized by the taxpayer will be income.
In discussing this issue, Professor Gregg Polsky states that the
"assignment of income doctrine is inapplicable to contingent fee
arrangements because the doctrine does not apply to arm's length
commercial transactions. 292 While Professor Polsky sets out two
285. Id.
286. Id. at 1081.
287. Id. at 1082.
288. Id. at 1082-83.
289. A taxpayer's basis in property is the dollar amount that the taxpayer is deemed to have
invested in the item for tax purposes. In many cases, a taxpayer's basis in property will be equal to
the cost of the property. I.R.C. § 1012 (2000).
290. Id. § 1001(a).
291. Id. Only dollars invested in an asset can create a basis, and the taxpayers in these cases
typically will have no dollars invested in the claim. Dollars spent on enforcing the claim that are
deductible expenses are not capitalized, and so are not added to the taxpayer's basis.
292. Polsky, Fruits and Trees, supra note 1, at 62. In its Commissioner v. Banks decision, the
Supreme Court applied the assignment of income doctrine instead of adopting Prof. Polsky's
approach. Comm'r v. Banks, Nos. 03-892, 03-907, __.U.S._ 2005 WL 123825 (Jan. 24, 2005).
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possible characterizations for the transaction, he believes that the tax
results to the plaintiff are the same under either scenario:
[E]ither the arrangement results in no transfer whatsoever until
the attorney is actually paid, or alternatively, the arrangement
results in a transfer of property... at the time the contingent fee
agreement is executed. Further, under either interpretation, the
tax consequences to [the plaintiff] are the same. She must
include the full amount of the settlement, including the attorney
fee portion, in her gross income and may take a miscellaneous
itemized deduction for the attorney fee portion.2 93
While it initially appears that the timing of the income recognition could
be different depending on which characterization applies, Professor
Polsky argued convincingly that, if one accepts that the plaintiff
transfers a right to the claim upon execution of the contingent fee
agreement, Code § 83 would apply to the transfer.2 94
This is crucial because Code § 83 provides that a transfer of property
for services is disregarded for tax purposes if there is a substantial risk of
forfeiture until such time as the interest vests. 295 As noted by Professor
Polsky, because the attorney would forfeit any interest in the property if
he or she were to withdraw from the case, the attorney's interest is
subject to substantial risk of forfeiture until the case is finally closed.296
Thus, in the attorney's fee scenario, there is no transfer for tax
purposes upon execution of the contract. Once the case has been
finalized and the risk of forfeiture is removed, the transfer officially
occurs for tax purposes. Because the plaintiff transferred property in
293. Polsky, Fruits and Trees, supra note 1, at 62-63.
294. Polsky, Fruits and Trees, supra note 1, at 108-11. I.R.C. § 83(a) provides
If, in connection with the performance of services, property is transferred to any person other
than the person for whom such services are performed, the excess of-
(1) the fair market value of such property (determined without regard to any restriction other
than a restriction which by its terms will never lapse) at the first time the rights of the person
having the beneficial interest in such property are transferable or are not subject to a substantial
risk of forfeiture, whichever occurs earlier, over
(2) the amount (if any) paid for such property,
shall be included in the gross income of the person who performed such services in the first
taxable year in which the rights of the person having the beneficial interest in such property are
transferable or are not subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture, whichever is applicable.
I.R.C. § 83(a).
295. I.R.C. § 83(a); Treas. Reg. § 1.83-1(a) (as amended in 2003).
296. See Polsky, Fruits and Trees, supra note 1, at 108--09; see also I.R.C. § 83(c)(1) ("The
rights of a person in property are subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture if such person's rights to
full enjoyment of such property are conditioned upon the future performance of substantial services
by any individual.").
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exchange for services, the plaintiff must recognize the difference
between the value of the services received from the attorneys and the
plaintiffs basis in the property transferred.297 As the plaintiff will have a
zero basis in the property, he or she will recognize the full amount as
income.298 Under Code § 83, unless an attorney makes a Code § 83(b)
election,299 the transfer takes place when the attorney's interest ceases to
be forfeitable, and that will occur when the case is resolved. Professor
Polsky concludes that, under either characterization (i.e., as an
immediate transfer of the claim subject to Code § 83 or no transfer until
the attorney is actually paid), the plaintiff should include the full amount
in income and the plaintiff should be allowed a miscellaneous itemized
deduction for the payment to the attorney.3 °0
Professor Polsky determines that only Congress can adequately solve
the problem and states "section 62 must be amended to add these
attorney's fees to the list of deductions taken into account in computing
the taxpayer's adjusted gross income. 301 Professor Polsky is correct;
and, to a considerable extent, Congress adopted his proposal when it
enacted the Civil Rights Tax Relief provision of the 2004 Act. 30 2 It is
noteworthy that his proposed solution and the 2004 Act properly cover
not only contingent fee arrangements, but also attorney's fees based on
297. I.R.C. § 1001(a); see Treas. Reg. § 1.61-2(d)(1) (as amended in 2003).
298. Polsky, Fruits and Trees, supra note 1, at 110; see Treas. Reg. § 1.83-6(b) (as amended in
2003) ("[A]t the time of a transfer of property in connection with the performance of services the
transferor recognizes gain to the extent that the transferor receives an amount that exceeds the
transferor's basis in the property.").
299. An interesting issue arising out of Professor Polsky's theory regarding the application of
Code § 83 is the possible application of Code § 83(b). Taxpayers can elect, under Code § 83(b), to
include in income property that is still subject to substantial risk of forfeiture. So, the attorney could
elect under Code § 83(b) to include his or her portion of the claim in income upon execution of the
contract, rather than wait until the final disposition of the case. In a separate article, this author has
examined the tax consequences of an attorney making that election and the question of whether it
could cure the plaintiff's tax problem. See generally Jeffrey H. Kahn, Could One Simple Election
Solve the Attorney Fee Issue?, 105 TAX NOTES 411 (2004).
300. Polsky, Fruits and Trees, supra note 1, at 121.
301. Polsky, Fruits and Trees, supra note 1, at 121
302. Section 703 of the Act states:
(a) DEDUCTION ALLOWED WHETHER OR NOT TAXPAYER ITEMIZES OTHER DEDUCTIONS-
Subsection (a) of section 62 (defining adjusted gross income) is amended by inserting after
paragraph (18) the following new item:
(19) COSTS INVOLVING DISCRIMINATION SUITS, ETC-Any deduction allowable under this
chapter for attorney fees and court costs paid by, or on behalf of, the taxpayer in connection
with any action involving a claim of unlawful discrimination ....
American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 703, 118 Stat. 1418, 1546-48.
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an hourly payment schedule,3 °3 which would not have been covered even
if the Supreme Court had held for the taxpayers in the recent decision.
However, Professor Polsky's proposal and the 2004 Act, while an
improvement, do not go far enough. All ordinary and necessary expenses
for the production or collection of income or for the management,
conservation, or maintenance of property held for the production of
income should be fully deductible. Placing limitations on such expenses
violates the basic principle that our tax system should tax only net
income. Whether it is an attorney's fee or some other expense, taxpayers
should be allowed to fully deduct the cost of producing income. While
that principle may be contravened because of a competing policy (such
as the denial of a deduction for illegal business expenses), there is no
competing principle that would justify denying part of the deduction for
valid profit-oriented expenses merely because they arose in an activity
that does not qualify as a trade or business.30 4 The 2004 Act does not go
nearly far enough; and, in some respects, is objectionable in that it
exacerbates the discriminatory .treatment of other parties who are
affected by the same plight in connection with claims that do not involve
discrimination.3 °5
Some expenses under Code § 212(1) and (2) are already fully
deductible as nonitemized deductions. Included in the Code § 62 list of
nonitemized deductions are deductions attributable to property held for
303. See id.
304. Because our society has determined to have an income tax system, we should strive to have
that system tax "income" as closely as possible. However, our tax system is also a product of our
economic, social, and political values. Some deductions, or denials of deductions, are valid even if
they do not serve the values of the income tax. See, e.g., William J. Tumier, Evaluating Personal
Deductions in an Income Tax-The Ideal, 66 CORNELL L. REv. 262, 286-87 (1980) ("[W]hen
certain deductions are necessary to perfect the tax base or are consistent with the values implicit in
an income tax, decisionmakers might decide to disallow those deductions because of their negative
impact on fundamental economic, social, or political values."). The denial of a deduction for illegal
business expenses is an example of where our tax system decided that other principles trump the
principle of a "correct" income tax treatment. However, as noted in the text immediately above,
there is no competing principle that justifies mechanically limiting or denying a deduction for Code
§ 212 expenses that are classified as miscellaneous itemized deductions.
305. Note that the 2004 Act would not cover the taxpayer in the Banaitis case in the Supreme
Court because the taxpayer's claim in that case, while based on a wrongful discharge, did not raise
an unlawful discrimination claim or a claim under any statute covered by the 2004 Act. See Banaitis
v. Comm'r, 340 F.3d 1074 (9th Cir. 2003), rev'd sub noam. Comm'r v. Banks, Nos. 03-892, 03-907,
__U.S. , 2005 WL 123825 (Jan. 24, 2005). Similarly, the 2004 Act would not cover the taxpayer
in Raymond v. United States, 355 F.3d 107 (2d Cir. 2004), petition for cert. filed, 72 U.S.L.W. 3659
(U.S. Apr. 9, 2004), because that case involved a wrongful termination lawsuit which did not
involve any claim of discrimination or a claim under any other statutory provision covered by the
2004 Act. See Raymond v. I.B.M. Corp., 954 F. Supp. 744 (D. Vt. 1997).
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the production of rents and royalties. 30 6 There is no principled
justification for classifying those expenses as nonitemized when other
production of income expenses are classified as itemized. The likely
explanation for this difference in treatment is that a lobbying group was
able to influence Congress. 30 7 This dichotomy highlights the unfairness
of the current classification system. If nonitemized classification is
appropriate for expenses incurred in connection with property held for
the production of rents or royalties, it is equally appropriate for any valid
expense attributable to the production or collection of income or the
management, conservation, or maintenance of property held for
production of income.
The case for nonitemized treatment for expenses "in connection with
the determination, collection, or refund of any tax"308 is weaker than the
case for the first two subsections of Code § 212. While such
tax-connected expenses arise only because a taxpayer has income (and
thus could be viewed as part of the cost of producing income), the
connection to income production is indirect and thus not comparable to
more direct expenses such as payments for the management of
investments. It is not a cost of producing income, but rather is a cost of
properly accounting to the government the amount of income that was
earned. Therefore, Code § 212(3) expenses should not be a nonitemized
deduction.
Congress should revise Code § 62 by adding to the list of nonitemized
deductions a subsection for the deductions allowed by Code § 212(1),
§ 212(2), § 167(a)(2), § 611, and comparable provisions that relate to
either (1) the production or collection of income or (2) the management,
conservation, or maintenance of property held for the production of
income. This revision would not only solve the attorney's fee issue, but
also would cure the inequitable treatment of many other expenses, as
well as many currently unanticipated problems that will arise in the
future.
306. I.R.C. § 62(a)(4) (2000) (classifying as nonitemized "[t]he deductions allowed by Part V
(section 161 and following), by section 212 (relating to expenses for production of income), and by
section 611 (relating to depletion) which are attributable to property held for the production of rents
or royalties").
307. It is easy to infer that the real estate and oil and gas lobbying groups wanted nonitemized
classification for these expenses.
308. Id. § 212(3).
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B. Employee Trade or Business Expenses
Another category of deductions that should be reclassified is
unreimbursed employee trade or business expenses. These are the only
trade or business expenses that are classified as miscellaneous itemized
deductions, and even several specified classes of employee expenses are
excluded from itemized treatment.30 9 Singling out such expenses for
limitation is unfair. As noted above, the grounds offered for limiting
such expenses apply equally well to trade or business expenses of
independent contractors. To reiterate, these limitations violate the basic
principle that taxes should be imposed only on net income. As shown in
the example in Part II.B, limitations on such expenses violate horizontal
equity, whether the comparison is made: (1) between an employee and
an independent contractor, or (2) between two employees, only one of
whom negotiated his compensation to include reimbursements of
expenses.
There is little doubt that Congress is aware of the inequity of
classifying employee business expenses as itemized deductions because
it has granted nonitemized classification for a few specific types of
employee business expenses-e.g., business expenses of a performing
artist, a state official, up to $250 of certain expenses of elementary and
secondary school teachers, and certain expenses of members of the
reserve components of the armed forces.31° Presumably, Congress felt
persons in those categories were in need of relief because their financial
position typically is such that they cannot readily absorb the tax penalty
imposed as a result of an inappropriate classification. Such ad hoc relief
measures are unfair to those who lack an organized association to bring
their plight to the attention of Congress. It would be far better to remove
all of the improper classifications than to make piecemeal adjustments in
response to organized complaints. Congress should allow a nonitemized
deduction for all ordinary and necessary business expenses of an
employee.
The facts of the 1996 Tax Court case of Brown v. Commissioner
309. Certain business expenses of a performing artist, a state official, up to $250 of expenses of
eligible educators, and expenses of members of reserve components of the armed forces are
classified as nonitemized deductions. I.R.C. § 62(a)(2)(B)-(E). The characterization for educator
expenses is scheduled to expire in 2006. Id. § 62(a)(2)(D) (as amended by § 307(a) of the Working
Families Relief Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-311, sec. 307(a), § 62, 118 Stat 1166, 1179).
Employees may also take a nonitemized deduction for qualified moving expenses. Id. § 62(a)(1 5).
310. See id. § 62(a)(2)(B)-(E).
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provide an interesting illustration of the plight that a low tax bracket
taxpayer can suffer because of the treatment of employee business
expenses as itemized deductions. 31' In that case, a waitress was required
by her employer to pay for any dishes she broke and for the bill of any of
her customers who skipped out without paying.312 She also split her tips
with busboys, bartenders, and similar employees.313 One question raised
in the case was whether those payments by the waitress and the portion
of her tips that she shared with others were itemized or nonitemized
314deductions. Because the waitress used the standard deduction, and
because the items in question totaled less than that deduction, she would
receive no benefit whatsoever from an allowance of a deduction for her
expenses if the deduction were itemized. The Tax Court resolved the
case without reaching the question of whether her deductions would be
itemized.31 5 It is clear, however, that any deductions that would be
allowable to the waitress for such expenses would be itemized because
they were unreimbursed employee business expenses. The facts of this
case illustrate that, even if the special limitations on itemized deductions
are inapplicable, the characterization of employee business expenses as
itemized deductions can cause severe hardship to a taxpayer.
C. The Estate Tax Deduction for Income in Respect of a Decedent-
Code § 691
The itemized characterization of the estate tax deduction allowed for
IRD interferes with the legislative purpose for granting that deduction.
As noted in Part II.C, Code § 691 provides an income tax deduction
(called an "estate tax deduction") for the amount of a decedent's estate
tax that is attributable to the inclusion in the decedent's gross estate of
the right to the IRD that the decedent held at the time of his death. The
congressional purpose for allowing the estate tax deduction is to ensure
that the overall tax burden imposed on the IRD (both income and estate
taxes) will be the same whether the income of the IRD is recognized by
the decedent before his death or by the recipient of the item after the
decedent's death,316 as long as the marginal income tax brackets of the
311. 72 T.C.M. (CCH) 59 (1996).
312. Id. at 59-60.
313. Id.
314. /d. at 60-61.
315. Id. at 63.
316. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
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decedent and the recipient are approximately the same. The
congressional purpose for allowing the estate tax deduction can be
fulfilled only if the Code permits the taxpayer to deduct the entire
amount of the estate tax. Any limitations imposed on that deduction will
frustrate the congressional goal of equalizing the tax burden on IRD with
the burden that would have been incurred if the income had been
recognized during the decedent's life.
Because the estate tax deduction is an itemized deduction, it is subject
to limitations. It is not a miscellaneous itemized deduction, so it is not
subject to the two percent of AGI floor,317 and is fully deductible under
the AMT system. However, it is subject to the overall limitation on
itemized deductions under Code § 68.
If the taxpayer is taxed under the AMT system, the estate tax
deduction is allowed in full because Code § 68 does not apply to the
AMT calculations. Ironically, a taxpayer whose tax is determined under
the AMT gets the full benefit of his estate tax deduction, whereas a
taxpayer whose tax is determined by the regular income tax system is
denied part of the deduction. Even under the AMT system, the fact that
the estate tax deduction is not reflected in the taxpayer's AGI can cause
the taxpayer to lose a portion of other deductions.' 8 The estate tax
deduction should be classified as a nonitemized deduction in order to
implement the congressional goal of having the overall burden on IRD
be the same regardless of when the IRD is recognized. It seems
especially unlikely that Congress would wish that goal to be attained
only when the recipient of the IRD is taxed under the AMT system.
One might question whether the fact that the estate tax deduction is
not based on the item's connection to income production means that its
inclusion in the nonitemized category would be inappropriate. While
connection with income production is the central core of nonitemized
deductions, that status has been granted in a number of cases in order to
carry out some other tax policy. There is no reason not to use
nonitemized classification as a tool to accomplish a legitimate tax policy
objective.319 There are numerous examples in Code § 62. For example,
317. See I.R.C. § 67(b)(7) (2000).
318. See, e.g., supra note 41 and accompanying text (listing deductions that are phased out if the
taxpayer's adjusted gross income or earned income exceeds a threshold amount).
319. See Turnier, supra note 304, at 286. Professor Turnier wrote,
An ideal tax system should reflect the fundamental economic, social, and political values of the
society. To insist that this not be done is to elevate those values implicit in an income tax
system over all other fundamental economic, social, and political values. Consequently,
adjustments to the tax base in the form of deductions or exclusions may be required where they
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the Code grants nonitemized deduction classification to alimony, certain
contributions to a medical savings account, the cost of a clean-fuel
vehicle, and interest on a qualified education loan.32°
D. Investment Interest
Investment interest is defined in Code § 163(d)(3) as deductible
interest paid or accrued on indebtedness allocable to property held for
investment. Investment interest is deductible only to the extent of the
amount of the taxpayer's "net investment income, 32' although a
carryforward is allowed.322 In effect, investment interest can offset only
net investment income.
Unless investment property for which the loan was taken produces
rents or royalties, any investment interest that is deductible must be
itemized.323 However, it is not a miscellaneous itemized deduction,324
nor is it subject to the Code § 68 overall limitation.325 Therefore, those
two limitations do not apply.
Because investment interest is a cost of producing income, it should
be fully deductible.326 By characterizing it as an itemized deduction, a
promote a society's fundamental values, even if such deductions constitute a departure from
the goal of taxing an income.
Turnier, supra note 304, at 286. Although Professor Turnier was discussing whether a deduction or
exclusion is valid, the same reasoning applies to the characterization and effectiveness of a
deduction.
320. See I.R.C. § 62(a)(10), (14), (16), (17).
321. Id. § 163(d)(1). "Net investment income" is defined in Code § 163(d)(4).
322. Id. § 163(d)(2).
323. Id. § 62(a)(4).
324. Id. § 67(b)(1).
325. See id. § 68(c)(2).
326. Because investment interest is related to the cost of producing income, one might argue that
Code § 163 is not necessary because interest would otherwise be covered by Code § 212. As one
commentator has noted:
At this juncture, one might ask why interest requires special rules. Is not interest a cost like any
other? If so, why are the general rules applicable to cost deductions insufficient? The argument
that costs should be deducted in the same tax period in which related income is included
certainly applies to all costs, including interest.
Interest requires special tax treatment for several reasons. The primary reason is the general
fungibility of money. Taxpayers may incur interest expense to carry many different
investments or assets. Some of the investments or assets may generate current income, others
deferred income, and still others fully exempt income. The unique problem with interest is
identifying the particular expenditure to which interest should be attributed. Only after the
expenditure is identified can the proper treatment of the expense be determined.
Cheryl D. Block, The Trouble with Interest: Reflections on Interest Deductions After the Tax
Reform Act of 1986,40 U. FLA. L. REv. 689, 695 (1988) (emphasis in original).
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taxpayer who uses the standard deduction cannot benefit from the
deduction. Further, it does not reduce a taxpayer's AGI, which can cause
a loss of portions of other deductions for which a percentage of AGI is a
floor or which are subject to phase-out based on AGI.
While the amount of tax at stake in this issue is considerably less than
the amounts at stake in most of the other items discussed in this Part,
even a relatively small inequity should be corrected. The deduction for
investment interest should be made nonitemized, but the restriction in
Code § 163(d) preventing it from reducing any income other than net
investment income can be retained. Given that restriction, it is especially
desirable not to impose any additional limitations on the deduction.
E. Interest on an Indebtedness Allocable to an Employee's Trade or
Business
For no apparent reason, the Code denies any deduction for interest
expenses incurred in connection with the trade or business of being an
employee.327 It is uncommon for an employee to borrow money for
reasons connected with his trade or business, but it is possible. For
example, an employee might borrow money to pay for courses that will
maintain or improve his skills in his work.328 A teacher might take out a
loan to pay for courses that she is required to take in order to retain her
job. An officer of a financially troubled corporation might be required to
make a loan to the corporation or lose his job, and the officer might have
to borrow the needed funds. Currently, there is no issue as to whether the
interest paid on such loans is itemized because Code § 163(h)(2)(A)
disallows any deduction for such interest.
Given that the current limitations on the deduction for employee
business expenses are unwarranted,329 the disallowance of any deduction
for an employee's interest expenses is indefensible. If an independent
contractor took out a loan for a business purpose, all of the interest
would be fully deductible as a nonitemized deduction. 330 There is no
apparent reason for treating an employee so inequitably. The legitimacy
of the employee's claim that the loan is business related is always open
327. I.R.C. § 163(h)(1), (h)(2)(A).
328. While Code § 221 grants a deduction for interest paid on a "qualified education loan," many
classes and programs do not qualify for that provision. In any event, the amount of the deduction is
subject to a dollar ceiling, and there is a phase-out provision. Id. § 221 (b).
329. See supra Part IV.B.
330. I.R.C. §§ 62(a)(1), 163(h)(2)(A).
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to challenge. However, if the employee can demonstrate that there was a
valid business purpose for borrowing the funds, the interest that he or
she pays, at the very least, should be a deductible expense. Indeed,
because it is directly connected with the production of income, it should
be made a nonitemized deduction. A general classification of employee
business expenses as nonitemized would solve that problem if
Code § 163(h) were amended to permit a deduction.
CONCLUSION
This Article sets forth several examples of areas where the Code
creates grossly unfair and indefensible consequences for taxpayers. One
example that has attracted a great deal of attention and commentary is
the attomey's fee problem, especially when it involves a contingent fee.
Because of that attention, Congress addressed the attorney's fee problem
in the 2004 Act. 331 However, the provision that Congress adopted not
only fails to solve comparable problems, it does not even solve the
attorney's fee problem in cases not involving discrimination or
otherwise covered in Code § 62(a)(19).
It was a mistake for Congress to address a broad structural problem
by sticking a finger in the leaking hole-that is, adopting a solution that
remedies only the specific factual circumstance that attracted attention.
The root cause of the problems described in this Article is the erroneous
characterization of expenses that are directly related to the production of
income as itemized deductions. This error of characterization imposes a
sizeable penalty on most individual taxpayers only because of the special
limitations imposed on many itemized deductions, including the AMT's
disallowance of any miscellaneous itemized deductions. Moreover, even
if the special limitations on itemized deductions were repealed, the
erroneous classification of an expense as an itemized deduction can
impose severe hardship on a taxpayer who is in a lower tax bracket and
332utilizes the standard deduction. Because it is likely that those or
similar limitations on itemized deductions will remain operative, it
becomes imperative to cure the underlying structural problem-the
improper classification of itemized deductions.333 It is only by doing so
331. See American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 703, 118 Stat. 1418, 1546-
48; supra note 302 and accompanying text.
332. See supra notes 311-15 and accompanying text.
333. Even if Congress were to repeal Code § 67, § 68, and the alternative minimum tax system, it
should still study the current classification of deductions because an item wrongly listed affects a
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that the current problems of this nature will be cured and future
problems can be avoided.
taxpayer's adjusted gross income, which is the measurement tool for many phase-out and limitation
floors. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 24(b) (stating phase-out for child tax credit is based on adjusted gross
income); id. § 151(d)(3) (stating phase-out for personal exemptions is based on amount that
taxpayer's adjusted gross income exceeds specified threshold).
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